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i .  Abstract 
This thesis examines the effect of CEO attributes and company fundamentals on 
company performance in CEO turnovers. The analyses were performed on a sample 
of 899 CEO turnovers between 2003 and 2009 in companies listed on the S&P 1500 
composite index in the US. A six-step model exploring various perspectives of the 
CEO turnover in the period [Event day -1/+2 years] finds that the market, on 
average, yields negative announcement return and then positive cumulative 
abnormal return in the subsequent two years. Our main finding is that the market 
reacts to changes made to the company fundamentals, and that it generally 
rewards changes in company fundamentals contributing to enhance the robustness 
of the companies’ balance sheets. We find that MBAs tend to run the operations 
with lesser margins, in terms of balance sheet robustness. Nonetheless, the different 
behavior between MBAs and engineers does not explain the market reaction. Even 
though MBAs and engineers have different fiscal strategies in the way they operate 
companies, the abnormal return is not sensitive to hiring a CEO with these 
educational profiles alone. It is rather the experience, and the fact that CEOs, on 
average, are able to introduce changes that fit the companies’ needs that appear to 
generate abnormal reactions in stock value. We also find that positive abnormal 
stock return in the transition year materializes in increased ROA and EBITDA margin 
in the two subsequent years. This confirms that the market is able to identify CEO 
turnovers that prove successful. This thesis confirms several previous findings within 
the research field of CEO turnover, and adds to the understanding of the underlying 
reasons for market reactions to CEO turnovers. 
 
 
Key words:  CEO turnover, abnormal stock return, company performance, CEO 
attributes, company fundamentals 
 3"
 
 
i i .  Content 
 
i .  ABSTRACT 2 
i i .  CONTENT 3 
i i i .  PREFACE 4 
1. INTRODUCTION 5 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 7 
3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 9 
4. DATA 11 
4.1 DATA SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS 11 
4.2 VARIABLES 14 
5. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 22 
5.1 CAR SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVER 22 
5.2 CHANGE IN FUNDAMENTALS SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVERS 26 
5.3 DRIVERS OF CAR 29 
5.4 DRIVERS OF FUNDAMENTALS 34 
5.5 PREDICTIVE MODEL FOR SUITED CEO ATTRIBUTES 43 
5.6 CAR AS PREDICTOR FOR OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE METRICS 49 
6. CONCLUSION AND INTERPRETATION 52 
7. REFERENCES 55 
8. APPENDIX 59 
8.1 DATA TABLES 59 
8.2 STATISTICAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS 65 
8.3 ECONOMETRIC TESTS 71 
8.4 ELABORATIONS ON STATISTICAL METHODS 75 
8.5 CLARIFYING EXAMPLES 77 
  
4"  
 
Jens Christian Aune Peter Riise 
i i i .  Preface 
With this thesis we complete our Masters of Science in Economics & Business 
Administration at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Our major is Financial 
Economics, and the thesis compiles theory from a variety of classes and fields of 
studies we have undertaken.  
 
Through the curriculum we have completed the past few years, we have 
accumulated knowledge about corporate finance and investment management, but 
especially during the case-based course Mergers & Acquisitions, we realized that 
firm value is just as much influenced by corporate governance than any technical 
financial theory.  
 
In the financial press, we get daily exposure to stories of charismatic and talented 
executives exercising major influence on their companies and sometimes even 
being the crucial factor for the companies’ success. With this thesis, we wanted to 
explore and quantify the impact from such individuals, and more specifically, 
uncover how much a change of the CEO matters for a company. 
 
The work on this thesis has been challenging, yet highly rewarding. It has been 
exiting to research the field of CEO turnovers, and for every new set of data we have 
collected, we have discovered new dimensions, nurturing hours of interesting 
discussions. The new era CEO has become much more than an executive; they are 
superstars, gurus and trendsetters. We have all been fascinated by the late Steve 
Job’s characteristic “…there is one more thing…” and Elon Musk’s inspiring dreams 
and ambitions. It is going to be exiting to follow how key personalities will shape 
corporations in the future. 
 
We wish to state our gratitude towards our supervising professor Karin S. Thorburn, 
who has been an invaluable partner for discussion and idea generation. Her 
feedback and contributions has been critical for how this thesis appears. Beyond 
the classroom and the advisor meetings, she has always been welcoming and 
willing to share of her knowledge. 
 
 
Bergen, June 19, 2015 
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1. Introduction 
The change of CEO is a major event for a company, and could set the pace for 
change and a new strategic direction for the firm. In the period between 2003 and 
2009 an average of ~14% of the largest US corporations replaced their CEO each 
year for various reasons1. 
 
“Great companies with the way they work, first start with great leaders.” 
Steve Ballmer, Former CEO of Microsoft 
 
Over the past two decades, empirical researchers have produced a large body of 
evidence on various aspects of the relation between CEO turnover and firm 
performance. The first important studies on CEO turnover and performance were 
conducted in the 1980s, and since then, different scholars have been focusing on a 
multitude of various aspects of the turnover/performance relation. In section 2 we 
will present the most recent and notable studies on the field.  
 
The announcement of a CEO turnover has been showed to make major impacts on 
the firm’s stock price, both upward and downward. When Gary Rodkin took over as 
chief executive in Conagra Foods Inc. the company experienced a 14,9% abnormal 
stock return in the first year. Dow Chemicals Inc., on the other side, suffered a 9,5% 
negative abnormal stock return in the one-year period after Andrew Liveris came in 
as CEO. These two men have different backgrounds; Rodkin is a Harvard MBA 
while Liveris holds an undergraduate degree in chemical engineering from a 
reputable university in Australia. Further, the companies they manage operate in 
different sectors, are of different sizes and found themselves facing deviant 
business challenges that require different strategies. The backdrop for the deviation 
in return is fragmented and a sum of numerous events and circumstances.  
 
We do not believe we can trace the market reaction to the turnover back to one 
single attribute or action, as the market will always reflect the whole story. Instead 
we are aiming to attach separate pieces of the puzzle to better depict how the 
interaction between the CEO attributes, firm characteristics and strategic actions in 
sequence impacts the company performance, both measured in abnormal stock 
return and changes in operational performance metrics.  
 
Therefore, this thesis will aim to shed new light on the overall research question:  
 
“What impacts the market reaction to a CEO turnover?” 
 
 
                                                
1 According to Booz & Company’s Annual Global CEO Succession Study of 2011 
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Subordinately, we will test the following six hypotheses:  
 
1. The market will react positively to a CEO turnover 
2. The turnover entails changes in company fundamentals 
3. Changes in company fundamentals will impact the abnormal stock return 
4. Certain CEO attributes and firm characteristics will dictate the choice of 
financing, investment and growth strategy decisions 
5. Large deviations between the expected and actual backgrounds and 
attributes of the appointed CEO’s will evoke stronger positive reactions in 
abnormal returns. 
6. Abnormal return will materialize in subsequent changes in operational 
performance metrics 
 
These six hypotheses will provide the basis for the thesis’ layout and structure. They 
will form the separate pieces of the larger puzzle, and will draw a line from CEO 
attributes through the changes in company fundamentals to the abnormal stock 
return.  
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous 
literature on the topics discussed. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. 
Section 4 will present the data utilized in the thesis, and gives a more thoroughly 
description of the variables. Section 5 presents the statistical tests we have 
conducted and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the thesis 
and offers our conclusions. 
 
 
 7"
 
2. Literature review 
There have been several researches and papers exploring the field of CEO turnover 
and company performance in various ways prior to our thesis, as a new CEO talent 
has proven to signal a new commitment to growth and focus on innovation that 
could translate into enhanced revenue. Nonetheless, empirical evidence show 
mixed results from the study of isolated factors that each affects the market reaction 
to CEO turnovers, without tying them together. The previous literature does not 
attempt to show the interaction between CEO attributes, firm characteristics and 
company fundamentals, and abnormal stock performance. 
 
Being among the first studies on the topic, Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) finds 
association between a firm's stock returns and subsequent top management 
changes. Consistent with internal monitoring of management, they find an inverse 
relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's share 
performance. However, they consider only retrospective performance as an 
explanation for the turnover, and do not regard the post-turnover stock 
performance. Later, Jenter and Lewellen (2014) found a close link between firm 
performance and CEO turnover, and estimate that more than 40% of turnovers in the 
first eight tenure years are performance-induced, but they do still not address the 
market reaction after the turnover. 
 
Several studies have been conducted on the relation between changes in company 
fundamentals and company performance in the time surrounding CEO turnovers. 
On the one hand, Murphy and Zimmerman (1992) examined whether changes in 
potentially discretionary variables are explained by poor economic performance, 
rather than direct managerial discretion. They find that turnover-related changes in 
R&D, advertising, capital expenditures and accounting accruals are due mostly to 
poor performance, but they do not link these changes to post-turnover performance. 
Nor do they link the changes in the potential discretionary variables to the new 
CEO’s attributes or the firm characteristics. On the other side, Barker and Mueller 
(2002) explore the relation between a discretionary variable and the new CEO’s 
attributes. They found that a CEO’s undergraduate education does not impact the 
R&D spending. However, a CEO with an advanced science or engineering degree 
has a significant increase in R&D spending. However, they do not attempt to tie any 
of these changes in R&D, nor any other company fundamental, to stock 
performance.  
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There have also been conducted studies on the relation between CEO attributes 
and company performance. Gottesman and Morey (2006) examine the relation 
between the CEO’s education quality and the company’s performance. They find no 
evidence of superior performance from CEOs from better schools. Conversely, 
Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2011) find association between both possession of a 
degree and where the degree was earned, and company performance. 
Nonetheless, none of these papers link their findings to the CEO’s strategic actions 
and how these actions would affect the company performance.  
 
Further studies examine the relation between CEO attributes and discretionary 
company fundamentals. Hu and Liu (2014) investigate the impact of CEOs' career 
experiences on corporate investment decisions and find that firms with CEOs who 
have more diverse career experiences exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivity 
and exploit more outside funds. However, they do not show how these findings 
relate to CEO turnovers, nor stock return.  
 
The papers we have reviewed each explores one single dimension of a CEO 
turnover, but none of them attempts to consolidate their findings into a 
comprehensive system. Our paper is most closely related to the literature examining 
the market reaction post-turnover, and builds on the previous findings discussed in 
this section. We utilize parts of the methodology used in each of the papers, and 
attempts to tie the results together to depict a holistic picture of how CEO attributes 
and company fundamentals interact, and, in turn, affects the abnormal stock return 
and company performance.  
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3. Experiment design 
The experiment design will be presented in this section, describing the empirical 
strategy and how we have approached our overall research question and the 
subordinated hypotheses.  
 
This thesis aims to depict the relation between the CEO’s attributes, the level and 
changes of certain financial variables (we will refer to this as “the company 
fundamentals”) that are believed to be subject to considerable managerial 
discretion and the company’s performance. The data will be more thoroughly 
presented in the next section. In order to support our hypotheses, we have 
developed a six-step experiment design to explore the relations and interactions 
between each of these three categories. By approaching the main hypothesis from 
several different angles, we aim to illuminate the main research question: What 
impacts the market reaction to a CEO turnover.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Six-step Experiment Design 
 
1. First, we use Eventus to calculate cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for all 
899 CEO turnovers, using the “Date became CEO” as t0. Thereafter, we 
calculate the average abnormal return in the sample for each day in the time 
range between 500 days before to 500 days after the turnover. We index the 
abnormal return (AR) at the turnover date to 100. The results from this test 
can be found in section 5.1.2. 
 
2. Second, we examine how certain company fundamentals and company 
performance metrics change in the period surrounding a CEO turnover. We 
measure the difference between the mean values for each of the variables in 
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year -1, i.e. the period between day -250 to 0 to the mean values of the same 
variables in the period between day 0 and 500. By doing this we seek to 
demonstrate significant differences in the variables before and after the CEO 
turnover. Section 5.2.2 will further elaborate on the results from this analysis.  
 
3. Third, we examine whether the changes of certain company fundamentals 
and company characteristics will drive CAR. We now use the year-to-year 
percentage change in the variable levels to better capture the new CEO’s 
actions. We run regressions between the fundamentals and characteristics 
against the CAR in year 0, 1 and 2, i.e. in the periods between day 0–250, 
251–500 and 501–750 respectively. We have shown the findings of this step 
in section 5.3.2. 
 
4. Fourth, we run regressions between the different CEO attributes and the 
different company fundamentals to examine whether there are any 
connections between a CEO’s background and characteristics, and the 
managerial discretion he exercises. Again, we use the year-to-year change 
in the fundamental values to capture the CEO’s action. We run regressions 
on each fundamental on an isolated basis, to avoid cross-elimination in the 
cases of null- or missing data on some of the fundamentals. The results can 
be found in section 5.4.2 
 
5. Fifth, we make a predicative model suggesting the probability for hiring a 
CEO with specific attributes2 based on several company fundamentals and 
industry specifics. Thereafter, we measured the fit between the CEO’s actual 
attributes and the probability for possessing the attributes for a given type of 
company. Concluding step 5, we run a regression between the absolute 
value of the difference between the CEO’s attribute and the probability for 
possessing said attribute against the CAR, thus examining whether an 
untypical hiring for a given company would yield an abnormal return in the 
stock price. The results are displayed in section 5.5.2, with further 
elaborations of the methodology in section 5.5.1.  
 
6. Finally, we test how the CAR in year 0, i.e. day 0 to 250 after the turnover, 
can act as a predictor for future operational performance metrics. This is 
conducted by running regressions between the CAR in year 0 and the 
change from year 0 to year 1 and 2, respectively. We show the results from 
this test in section 5.6.2. 
                                                
2 All CEO attributes in this step are discrete dummy variables, thus categorizing the CEO to belong 
either belong in the group or are an outsider. The variables are: engineering/non-engineering, 
MBA/non-MBA, grad school/non-grad school, undergrad school/non-undergrad school, over/under 
average number of board memberships, top 1/non-top 1 university attendance etc.  
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4. Data 
This section presents the data underlying the empirical research in this thesis. First, 
we will, in section 4.1, account for the sources of the raw data that has been used, 
and which limitations we have made to the data. Subsection 4.2 will further describe 
the variables used.  
 
4.1 Data sources and l imitations 
We obtain data for a sample of 899 CEO turnovers in 729 companies in the period 
from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2009 among the S&P 1500 companies from 
the ExecuComp database. The turnover date is determined by the variable “Date 
became CEO”. This is the year defined as the turnover year and acts as t 
throughout the thesis.  
 
During this year, both the former and the newly appointed CEO serve part of the 
year. In the transition year both CEOs will have some influence on the company. 
Even if the turnover occurs in the beginning of the year, the former CEO might 
already have set the budget, operating plans and decided on other premises for the 
transition year. On the other hand, if the turnover happens late in the year the new 
CEO might have been involved in the planning even before his formal instatement. 
In this thesis we assume the latter to be applicable to the sample companies, and 
that the new CEO has exercised influence on the transition year. The variable “Date 
left as CEO” indicates the day the CEO ended his employment in the company.  
 
We choose to omit CEOs with tenure of less than a year, thus eliminating interim 
CEOs and other CEOs with no opportunity to make an actual impact on the 
company. As some companies have had several CEO turnovers in the period, we 
provide each CEO/company combination with a CEO/Ticker ID, and treat each 
combination as unique events. As shown in figure 2, the number of turnovers in 
each year is fairly equal, both within the various sectors and in total – thus reducing 
the cluster effect to a minimum.  
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Figure 2 - The sample size and distr ibution of the data between sectors3 
 
The CEOs’ education information is obtained through the Capital IQ executive 
profile database and includes field of study, major and university for all higher 
education. In the cases of no available education information, we assume the data 
to be complete and that the CEO has not completed higher education. The 
exception is where the CEO has completed a graduate or MBA degree even if no 
undergraduate degree has been recorded – obviously these CEOs had also 
completed an undergraduate degree of some kind. The education data is 
supplemented with a modified version of The Times Higher Education World 
University ranking of 2014 that will be further outlined in section 4.2.1. The degrees 
come with numerous different names and types so we find it appropriate to compile 
them into fewer categories of overall fields of study4. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Number of data points in the period t-1 and t+2 of the transit ion year 
                                                
3 The remaining unmarked sectors are Utilities, Retail Trade, Wholesale trade, Mining, Construction and 
Agriculture in that ascending order. 
4 The compiled fields of study are business, administration & service, engineering, law, science, social 
studies and other/unknown. 
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We obtain the companies’ fundamental data from the CompuStat database. The 
fiscal year that the CEO was instated corresponds with the fiscal year of the 
fundamental data, disregarding the exact month of the instatement. Most of the 
fundamentals are only reported annually, and will be end-of-year values. For that 
reason it proves impossible to match the annually reported fundamental data with 
the exact one-year period from the turnover date. The median turnover month in the 
sample is May, and we will face a potential error source when matching the first 
year of the CEO with the year of the fundamental data. We argue that the 
forthcoming CEO can exercise his influence even before his recorded start date, 
and thus, we found it the most appropriate procedure to match the year of the 
turnover to the same fiscal year for the fundamental data. As outlined earlier in this 
section, we refer to this year as the transition year.  
 
Year 1 (the second fiscal year in which the CEO is employed) is thus the first full 
year the CEO has managed, certain of no overlap with the previous CEO. We obtain 
data for a period of t-1 years to a maximum of t+2 year from the transition year. If the 
CEO’s tenure was less than 2 years, we only obtain data until the year he5 left office, 
explaining the drop in number of data points we see in figure 3 above. We omit CEO 
turnovers with missing fundamental data for the period t-1, as we cannot measure 
the impact of the turnover. Some of these companies was first listed or even 
founded in the period between 2003 and 2009, and the “Date became CEO” 
variable could very well indicate the IPO date of the company and not indicate a 
turnover at all.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Timeline for data 
 
Performance data is collected from two sources; Tobin Q, ROE, ROA and the 
EBITDA margin are calculated on the basis of the company fundamentals from 
CompuStat and CAR is calculated using Eventus.  
                                                
5 Using ‘he’ to describe CEOs reflects more than convention: only 28 of the 899 CEOs depicted in our 
sample are female. 
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4.2 Variables 
In this section we will present the variables we use as input data in our statistical 
analyses, and discuss the limitations and assumptions for each variable. We 
categorize the variables in accordance to the empirical strategy, and will through 
this thesis refer to these categories as the CEO’s attributes, the company 
fundamentals, firm characteristics and the company’s performance metrics. For 
sources and definition for each variable, see appendix 8.1.1.  
 
4.2.1 CEO attr ibutes 
The CEO attributes category consists of two subcategories. First, we provide “CEO 
information” variables. These variables include, but are not limited to, Age, Gender, 
Recruiting, Former CEO Retention, Forced Exit and Number of Board Memberships. 
Further, we have included data on CEO compensation for each year; both total 
compensation and compensation divided into its different components6. We also 
record the percentage of total shares owned7 in the company by the CEO.  
 
The classification of CEO recruiting approach follows Weisbach (1988); A CEO is 
classified as externally recruited if he has been with the firm for less than one year 
before he became CEO, and all other successions are classified as internally. In the 
cases of missing information, we consult previous literature on CEO turnover, and 
assess the likelihood of the data being true or false. For recruiting, the missing 
values are due to no listed data for when the CEO first joined the company. We then 
assume a previous career path within the company and classify them as internally 
recruited. This is in line with the proportion of external recruiting of 21% that Clayton, 
Hartzell and Rosenberg (2003) find in their paper.  
 
From the variable “Number of Board memberships” we create a dummy variable 
called “Board Experience” indicating whether the CEO holds more or less positions 
in boards than the average in the sample. One CEO in particular serves as a good 
example of why it is important to clean the data for outliers before determining the 
threshold for the appropriate average: The CEO held 147 board memberships, with 
the great majority proving to be in various straw/holding companies originating from 
the same investment vehicle. After cleaning the dataset for such obvious outliers, 
we find the average to be slightly more than four board memberships per CEO, on 
par with the median. Thus, a CEO with more than average experience, measured 
from the number of board memberships, is indicated with the value 1. We find this 
measurement to be a fair proxy for the scope of the CEO’s post-education 
experience, his network and capabilities.  
 
                                                
6 Total compensation includes Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Restricted Stock Grants, LTIP Payouts, All 
Other and Value of Options Exercised. 
7 Fully diluted basis, accounting for stock options 
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The variable “Former CEO retention” indicates whether the former CEO remained in 
the company as Chairman. To determine this, we use the variable “Last position 
held” from ExecuComp, and classify all CEOs where last position held include CEO, 
chief executive officer etc. as not retained. If the last position the CEO held in the 
company before leaving office was the CEO position, then the person has obviously 
left the company completely. CEOs with titles like chairman, chrm, etc., but with no 
mentions of a CEO position, are classified as retained, indicating that the former 
CEO remained in the company as chairman after the turnover (Maharjan, 2014). The 
CEOs where last position held does not include any references to neither CEO nor 
chairman are classified as “Other”. These are assumed to not have a company 
afterlife where they could impact the operations and strategy.  
 
The most widely used procedure to classify turnovers as “forced” follows Parrino 
(1997) and uses press reports along with an age criterion and further refinements. 
Peters and Wagner (2014) have assembled a dataset based on these criteria and 
have kindly shared the turnover data used in their paper “The executive turnover 
risk premium”. It contains the dates of forced CEO turnovers of all firms recorded in 
the ExecuComp database between 1993 and 2010, thus covering the entire 
timespan and all companies mentioned in this thesis. Forced turnovers are, 
according to Clayton, Hartzell and Rosenberg (2003) not very common, and in their 
data forced turnovers account for only 17% of all turnovers. Hence, in the cases of 
missing information on the former CEO, we classify the turnovers as voluntary. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Sample statist ics of the CEO information 
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  False % True % 
Former CEO retention (as chairman) 673 75 % 226 25 % 
External recruiting (within 1 year of turnover) 788 88 % 111 12 % 
Gender (Male = TRUE, Female = FALSE) 28 3 % 871 97 % 
Forced turnover (Forced=TRUE, voluntary=FALSE) 767 85 % 132 15 % 
     Table 1 - Sample statist ics of the CEO information 
 
Further, we describe the “CEO’s educational background”. This data includes field 
of study, major, university and ranking for both undergraduate-, graduate-, MBA- 
and PhD level. In total, 716 CEOs completed degrees at different education levels at 
a total of 417 different universities. The remaining 183 CEOs in the sample do not 
hold formal education. In the few cases where a CEO has completed more than one 
degree at the same level at different universities, he is only credited for the highest 
ranked university. The effect of multiple degrees is accounted for in the variable 
Number of Degrees.  
 
The university ranking is an adjustment to The Times Higher Education World 
University ranking of 2014. Arguing that universities offer not only education, but 
also an arena for networking, we accredit the universities for attendance among our 
sample of CEOs. The university with the highest overall attendance is assigned with 
a 100% attendance score, and the remaining universities’ attendance ranking is 
scaled according to their respective overall attendance. The attendance score is 
then equally weighted to the score from the Times ranking. Hence, we try to capture 
the effect of the networking opportunities. Let’s use Harvard University as an 
example. The university is ranked third in the original ranking, but when we include 
attendance it becomes an undisputed number one. The fact that ~9% of all CEOs in 
the sample with a degree attended Harvard facilitates for unique network building 
compared to other top universities, which arguably has comparable educational 
quality. Further, we observe that near half of the CEOs in the sample attended one 
or more of the top 50 ranked universities during their education.  
 
“You don’t need to be a genius or a visionary, or even a college graduate for that 
matter, to be successful. You just need framework and a dream.” 
Michael Dell, CEO of Dell 
 
Based on the adjusted score, we classify the universities into the following 
accumulating categories: Top 1, Top 5, Top 10, Top 25 and Top 508. We argue that 
as long as the CEO has been affiliated with the university at some level, he will 
benefit from its reputation and the network building opportunities it creates. We 
acknowledge that candidates attending several of the top ranked universities during 
                                                
8 A list of the top 50 universities by our modified ranking can be found in appendix 8.1.4 
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their education could have gained a wider network than those who completed all 
levels of their education in one university. Nevertheless, we choose to only accredit 
the CEO for the best of the universities he attended, assuming this would capture 
the main effect of reputation and networking. In figure 6 below are a summary of the 
attendance for each education level. A summary of the attendance for the CEOs’ 
top university can be found in table 2 below.  
 
Figure 6 – Distr ibution between the f ields of study in the sample 
 
The Capital IQ data operates with a multitude of different majors. We find it 
appropriate to compile these into fewer overall categories: business, engineering, 
science, law, social studies, administration & service and other/unknown. A total of 
1213 degrees have been earned among the CEOs in the sample, with business 
degrees heavily dominating. Some CEOs have completed a major within more than 
one field of study. We capture this in two variables; the dummy variable “Dual 
degree” measures whether the CEO has completed more than one major at the 
same level of education. The majority of these occurrences are CEOs completing 
both a BA and a BS. The other variable is the “Number of different fields” measuring 
how many different fields the CEO has studied throughout his entire education, from 
undergraduate level up to PhD level. The most usual combinations resulting in 
multiple majors are a BS in business combined with a JD in law (14 occurrences) 
and a BS in engineering combined with a MBA (11 occurrences). We also introduce 
various dummy variables indicating whether the CEO possesses certain 
qualifications; holding a PhD degree, holding a MBA degree, completed juridical 
degree, i.e. LLB or JD, completed some kind of engineering degree, completed an 
undergraduate degree and completed a graduate degree. Throughout the thesis we 
highlight dummy variables in statistical output by showing them in italics.  
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Panel A 
      
 Undergraduate Graduate 
  Count All CEOs With degree Count All CEOs With degree 
Top 1 12 1,33 % 1,68 % 11 1,22 % 5,47 % 
Top 5 37 4,12 % 5,17 % 30 3,34 % 14,93 % 
Top 10 75 8,34 % 10,47 % 45 5,01 % 22,39 % 
Top 25 116 12,90 % 16,20 % 69 7,68 % 34,33 % 
Top 50 179 19,91 % 25,00 % 86 9,57 % 42,79 % 
All Others 521 57,95 %  115 12,79 %  
No Degree 183 20,36 %  698 77,64 %  
Missing data 169      
Total 899   899   
       
Panel B 
      
 MBA PhD 
  Count All CEOs With degree Count All CEOs With degree 
Top 1 45 5,01 % 15,20 % 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 
Top 5 93 10,34 % 31,42 % 5 0,56 % 16,67 % 
Top 10 108 12,01 % 36,49 % 12 1,33 % 40,00 % 
Top 25 136 15,13 % 45,95 % 14 1,56 % 46,67 % 
Top 50 159 17,69 % 53,72 % 19 2,11 % 63,33 % 
All Others 137 15,24 %  11 1,22 %  
No Degree 603 67,07 %  869 96,66 %  
Missing data       
Total 899   899   
       
Panel C 
      
 Top degree 
   Count  All CEOs  With degree 
Top 1  64  7,12 %  8,94 % 
Top 5  123  13,68 %  17,18 % 
Top 10  173  19,24 %  24,16 % 
Top 25  233  25,92 %  32,54 % 
Top 50  309  34,37 %  43,16 % 
All Others  407  45,27 %   
No Degree  183  20,36 %   
Total  899     
       Table 2 - Summary of university attendance at different education levels 
                                                
9 Some CEOs were listed without an undergraduate degree even if they had completed a graduate or 
MBA degree. We did managed to retrieve most of the missing data through web searches, but 16 
CEOs’ undergraduate education data remain unknown. 
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4.2.2 Company fundamentals 
In the second category, we find the “Company characteristics” that are descriptive 
variables about the company, such as S&P Index, Exchange, Industry 
Categorization, Credit Rating, Share Structure and Entrenchment Index.  
 
The companies in our data sample are all from the S&P 1500 composite index, 
consisting of the S&P 500 index, the S&P 400 Midcap index and the S&P 600 
Smallcap index. The companies in the sample are either traded on NYSE, Nasdaq 
or AMEX. We have included the AMEX companies in NYSE, as they only amounted 
for a very small fraction of the total amount of companies and share many 
characteristics.  
 
The industry categorization we use is the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system, which classifies the companies into 10 divisions (United States Department 
of Labor, 2015). The divisions are separated by the first digit in the SIC code and 
are presented in appendix 8.1.2. The credit rating is obtained from CompuStat and 
is only available for certain years. We assume the credit rating to remain the same 
as the adjacent year(s) when data is not listed.  
 
Further, the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) tracks 24 provisions of 
corporate governance. The entrenchment index (E-index) is an index based on 6 of 
these provisions10 and was constructed by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). 
The index gives each company a score between 0 and 6 that describes to which 
extent the provisions provide incumbents at least nominally with protection from 
removal or the consequences of removal in each year. We have also here assumed 
that years of missing values are equal to the previous year’s index value, as the data 
is only available for every second year. The Share Structure indicates whether a 
company operates with a dual or single share structure. This information is also 
collected from the paper by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2009).   
 
The second category also comprise of the “Company Fundamentals”, which are 
selected items from the companies’ financial statements from CompuStat. In this 
thesis, one of our focus points are the CEO’s actions, which we translate to choices 
regarding financial variables assumed to be subject to considerable managerial 
discretion. We will examine the variables Long-term debt, Working Capital, Capital 
Expenditures, Acquisitions, Dividends and Research & Development. To scale the 
variables, we use Total Assets to ensure that the variables are comparable across 
firms of different sizes. This also enables us to disregard the effect of inflation, as all 
sizes are ratios between two measures from the same year. We primarily use the 
scaled values for the years leading up to the CEO turnover. In section 6, we will 
                                                
10 The six provisions are staggered board, limitations to amending bylaws, limitation on amending the 
charter, supermajority to approve a merger, golden parachute and poison pills 
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more thoroughly describe how this scaling helps us overcome econometric 
problems in the data.   
 
We also measure the change in the “Company Fundamentals” between the years. 
This is a more sufficient way to capture the effect of the CEO’s decisions and 
actions, as it will describe the year-to-year change rather than the level of the 
relative values. A CEO could be hired by a company with an already high level of 
debt, and thus his attributes would falsely be recorded as attributes contributing to 
a high debt level, even if the CEO, on the contrary, induced reductions of leverage 
when he entered office. The percentage changes in debt from year to year would, 
however, capture the impact on the debt level by the CEO. We primarily use the 
change-variables for the period after the turnover. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Average and median year-to-year change in company fundamentals over the 
transit ion year and fol lowing two years after CEO turnover 
 
4.2.3 Company performance 
Finally, in the third category we measure “Company Performance” using five 
different metrics. We separate between the operational performance metrics 
including Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Asset (ROA) and EBITDA margin and 
the market-based performance margins including Tobin’s Q and Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR).  
 
ROE and ROA measures the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) over end-of-year values for Market Value of Equity and Total 
Assets, respectively. We use EBITDA instead of Net Income to minimize the effect of 
earnings management that may be done using depreciation, impairments and 
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change in capital structure11. Using EBITDA, we argue that we find a better measure 
of the firms’ operational returns. We further acknowledge that using start-of-year 
values is more traditional, but one can just as well argue that end-of-year values are 
the most appropriate – as we do not know the exact timing during the year that the 
values were accumulated (Nissim, 2014). The EBITDA margin is the EBITDA divided 
by the firms’ total revenue. This indicates efficiency in production and will be a 
measure on profitability in the firms’ operations.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Operational performance metrics in sample f irst 3 years after CEO turnover 
 
Further, Tobin’s Q measures the ratio between the market value of a firm's existing 
shares and debt to the replacement cost of the firm's physical assets. We have 
assumed a 1:1 relation between market value and book value of the debt, and use 
book value of the total assets as replacement value. The theory further states that if 
Q is greater than one, additional investment in the firm would make sense because 
the profits generated would exceed the cost of the firm's assets. If Q is less than 
one, the firm would be better off selling its assets instead of trying to put them to use 
(Tobin, 1969). 
 
Finally, the CAR measures the sum of the differences between the actual return of a 
stock and the expected return. A detailed explanation of how we calculated the 
CAR will follow in section 5.1.112. 
                                                
11 The EBITDA could be influenced by improvements in the EBITDA margin, suggesting a combination 
of higher revenues and lower COGS and SG&A. Thus, we measure the impact of cost saving measures 
indirectly using EBITDA. 
12 Announcement returns, i.e. 3-days CAR, for the seperate companies could not be calculated with the 
input data available to us.  
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5. Methodology and results 
We have now presented the experiment design and the data. This section will 
present the methodology and the results from the statistical analyses. For each of 
the six steps outlined in section 3, we will first go through the methodology and then 
conclude each step by presenting the statistical output, the results and its 
implications before moving on to the next step13.  
 
5.1 CAR surrounding CEO turnover 
The first topic we will address is whether a CEO turnover actually has an impact on 
stock returns. There are two parallel approaches to explain the expected outcome 
of the stock return after a CEO turnover: (i) Dezso (2007) argues that corporate 
boards will only replace a CEO if the potential gain exceeds the cost of firing the 
former CEO. Thus, we anticipate long-term improvements of the operations after the 
replacement of a CEO. (ii) McAnally, Srivastava and Weaver (2008) argue that the 
new CEO will have incentives to actively use earnings management to lower the 
expectations of future value to lower the strike price for his stock based 
compensation. This will result in a short-term contraction in CAR before the stock 
return will pick up in the long-term. We hypothesize that the market will react 
positively to a CEO turnover in the long-term. 
 
5.1.1 Methodology 
To determine the market reaction to a CEO turnover we generate the CAR for each 
individual CEO appointment based on the specific date of the turnover. Using CAR 
as a metric for stock value assumes that the efficient market theory holds. 
 
In 1970, Fama published the article Efficient Capital Markets (Fama, 1970) where 
the term “efficient market” was first used. However, the idea of efficient markets 
goes as long back as to the 16th century, and have since then been reviewed and 
tested by a multitude of scholars (Sewell, 2011). The efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) states that it is impossible to "beat the market" because stock market 
efficiency causes existing share prices to always incorporate and reflect all relevant 
information. Hence, the only way to increase returns would be accompanied by 
taking on a larger risk. The assumptions for the hypothesis to hold are exacting 
requirements, and we will not find a market in the real world where all information is 
truly fully available. Strictly speaking the EMH has been proven by several studies to 
be false, but in spirit is profoundly true. We will, in the following, assume that the 
                                                
13 In the following, ***, ** and * will annotate statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Statistical significance is measured using p-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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market will absorb new information and incorporate it in the share price. Thus, when 
a CEO is replaced and the information about the new CEO’s abilities, attributes and 
strategy reaches the market, the share price will immediately reflect the market’s 
assessment of the impact on future performance. Therefore, we are suggesting that, 
according to EMH, the abnormal return that occurs at the time of the CEO turnover 
(0 to 250 days) is the markets way of factoring in signal effects for the future 
potential for value creation within a given firm. Conversely, in year 1 (250 to 500 
days) and 2 (500 to 750 days), the abnormal return is expected to respond to 
fundamental changes implemented by the new CEO. A potential drawback is that 
the longer the abnormal return is measured post the CEO appointment date, the 
CAR can be subject to other market shocks than we are able to control for 
throughout our analysis. Because of this potential issue, we have been reluctant to 
extend the analysis farther than a maximum of 750 days, or 3 years, post the 
turnover date, from where we assume that the value effect of the CEO turnover is 
continuously diluted by other events. 
 
To calculate CAR, we have utilized Eventus to run a Fama-French Basic Event Study 
with daily factors, using the trading day that falls on (or closest to) the recorded date 
the CEO turnover was completed. As an extension to the calculation of the expected 
return of a stock or portfolio defined in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
Fama, French and Carhart (1997) adds three variables to account for company size, 
value or growth characteristics and the tendency of persistent returns. 
 ! !!! = !! + !!! !!"# ! + !!!!"#! + !!!!"! + !!!"#! + !!! 
   
Here, ! !!"# ! measures the daily return of the stock in relation to the return of the 
CRSP value-weighted market benchmark above the risk free rate14; !"#! controls for 
value versus growth stocks by including ‘high minus low’ in terms of book-to-market-
ratio; !"#!  includes firm size by calculating ‘small minus big’ in market 
capitalization, this controls for the fact that that smaller firms have a higher value 
potential than larger firms; and, !"#!  that includes the market momentum through 
calculating the premium of positive performance over negative performance on a 
monthly basis. This factor controls for the fact that future performance is 
increasingly probable if the stock has been performing at a positive average over 
the last 12 months. With this four-factor model, Fama, French and Carhart have 
enabled predictions of expected stock returns far superior to the traditional CAPM 
model15. Consequently, it adds a high quality CAR variable to our dataset that better 
illustrates movements in firm value surrounding CEO turnovers.     
 
                                                
14 The risk free rate used in Eventus is the yield on the one-month maturity on the US treasury bill 
15 R2 of the Fama-French four-factor model is close to 90% compared to CAPM’s 60% in predicting 
stock returns 
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In directing Eventus to extract CAR, we have assumed that a year consist of an 
average of 250 trading days, and we measure CAR in the period t-500 to t+750 days 
from the turnover date in one year intervals. The period from day 0 to 250 after the 
turnover date is referred to as year 0, or the transition year. Hence, the CEO will 
have been in office for all dates included in this data. For CEOs that started later in 
the year the data will be skewed to some extent, as the CAR follows the one-year 
period after the turnover date, rather than fiscal years.  
 
 
 
Figure 9 - Estimation window and event window used in CAR calculation 
 
The above figure illustrates which ranges we use for estimating the CAR, and how 
Eventus calculates the abnormal return (Eventus, 2015). In appendix 8.1.6 we 
elaborate on how CAR is calculated and which settings that have been used in the 
Eventus software. 
 
5.1.2 Results 
In this section we explore changes in CAR surrounding a CEO turnover. We assume 
CAR to be normally distributed around 0 over time and across companies. In figure 
10 below, we show the average AR for each day in the period of 2 years before and 
after the turnover date. We see that the average AR in the sample is declining 
towards the turnover date, then to increase steadily for the next 2 years subsequent 
to the CEO turnover. As displayed in table 3, the CAR in the one-year period before 
the turnover is -0.01%. The CAR in the first year [Days 0, 250] is 2.79%, and 2.94% 
in the second year [Days 250, 500] after the turnover. This indicates that, on 
average, the stocks are underperforming compared to the expected return, 
suggested by the Fama-French four-factor model, in the time leading up to the 
turnover. It further suggests that the market responds positively to a change of CEO, 
yielding a positive CAR over the first year. As we will see in the next subsection, 
these findings are statistically significant at a 10% level.  
-296! 0 ! +250! +500! +750!-46!
Compute Abnormal Return:!Estimate parameters:!
Estimation Window:!
(-46, -296) !
Event day = 0 ! Event Window:!
(0,250), (250,500), (500,750)!
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 Cumulative Average Return in Period 
Days [-500, -250] +2.35% 
Days [-250, 0] -0.01% 
Days [0, 250] +2.79% 
Days [250, 500] +2.94% 
  Table 3 - One-year average CAR 
 
In the first 60 days after the turnover we see a decline in the abnormal return, before 
it picks up and increases steadily for the next two years. This supports the 
arguments of McAnally et al. (2008) that CEOs entering office use provisions and 
impairments to miss earnings targets in order to increase the value of their stock 
option grants. In the longer term, the positive trend in CAR can be explained by the 
CEO’s actions rather than market expectations. In step 3, we present results 
describing which corporate actions that initiate abnormal return. The long-term 
positive CAR also supports Dezso (2007) that argues that a new CEO will only be 
instated in the cases where the company is sufficiently underperforming and there 
are large improvement potentials.  
 
 
Figure 10 - Average day-to-day abnormal return development in the sample. AR is 
indexed to 100 at t=0. Data labels indicate one-year average CAR 
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5.2 Change in fundamentals surrounding CEO turnovers 
We have now shown that the market tends to react positively to a CEO turnover. 
Now, we want to explore whether the market reaction is followed by any changes 
within the firm, in terms of company fundamentals, or if the reaction comes solely 
from stock return expectations. We hypothesize that the turnover entails changes in 
company fundamentals. According to Jenter and Lewellen (2014) more than 40% of 
CEO turnovers are performance-induced. This makes us believe that there is room 
for improvements in the company, and that new CEOs generally will try to make 
changes, including the fiscal fundamentals.  
 
5.2.1 Methodology 
In this step, we summarize changes in firm performance and firm fundamentals from 
the year before [-250 to 0 days] the CEO turnover and three years into the future ([0 
to 250 days], [250 to 500 days], and [500 to 750 days]). This is completed to add to 
the understanding of how firms are re-structured on average, given changes in 
several metrics’ on an isolated basis. To perform this analysis, we have conducted t-
tests on the equality of the means, which let us conclude whether the changes in 
means are statistically significant. In theoretical terms, we test if  
 !!!"#!!"!! = !!!!!"!!"#!:!!!"#!!"!!"":!!!""!!"!!"#!, !"#!!"#"$%"!! 
 
through, 
 ! = (! − !!)√!!  
 
When applying the test to our dataset, the results increase the understanding of 
which holistic changes that actually yield differences. By including the time aspect, 
we are able to uncover which re-structuring initiatives that are implemented in the 
near and long-term. 
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5.2.2 Results  
In this subsection we will present the results from the analysis of step 2 and offer our 
discussion of the meanings and implications of the findings.  
 
  Days -250 to 0 Days 0 to 500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  N Mean Mean Diff. from t-1 
CAR 899 0,003 0,027 0,0237* 
Tobin’s Q 899 1,422 1,383 -0,039 
ROE 899 0,335 0,266 -0,0687 
ROA 899 0,125 0,125 0,0000 
EBITDA margin 899 0,158 0,156 -0,0020 
EV / Sales 899 2,339 2,342 0,0037 
Revenues / Total Assets 899 0,951 0,939 -0,0119 
Acquisitions / Total Assets 899 0,018 0,020 0,0017 
Capital Expenditures / Total Assets 899 0,046 0,042 -0,0034** 
Cash / Total Assets 898 0,041 0,047 0,0053* 
LT debt / Total Assets 899 0,182 0,178 -0,0040 
Working Capital / Total Assets 899 0,156 0,166 0,0101* 
Dividends / Total Assets 896 0,013 0,015 0,0018* 
R&D / Total Assets 896 0,022 0,022 0,0004 
SG&A / Total Assets 896 0,182 0,181 -0,0019 
Sale of Property / Total Assets 896 0,002 0,002 0,0003 
Sale of Investments / Total Assets 896 0,070 0,082 0,0115 
E-index 706 2,530 2,551 0,0213 
CEO ownership 553 0,002 0,004 0,002*** 
Share Structure 706 0,101 0,097 -0,0033 
     Table 4 - Change in ( i i)  fundamentals and (i i i )  performance around CEO turnover 
 
Column 2 in table 4 above presets the mean value of the variables in the year before 
the turnover, and column 3 presents the mean over the first two years, or 500 days, 
after the turnover. We calculate the difference between the two periods in column 4. 
We see that the only change proving significance on a 1% level, is the CEO 
ownership variable, suggesting that new CEOs tend to have a greater stakes in the 
company than their predecessors. We argue that when the board replaces the CEO, 
they want to better align the incentives of the CEO and the other stakeholders, 
ultimately the shareholders. We see this as a measure to reduce the agent-principal 
problems that may arise if the CEO is driven mainly by short-term gains from his 
bonus rather than the long-term vesting value created from his equity position and 
the stock options he has been granted16. Recalling the argument on stock option 
grant and firm value from the previous section, increased CEO ownership may also 
give incentives to conduct earnings management to lower the value of the firm at the 
turnover to increase the value of the stock-based compensation package.  
                                                
16 On average, annual bonuses account for ~50% of a CEO’s Total Current Compensation (Salary + 
Bonus). 
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Next, we note that the mean CAR of the sample increases on average by 2,37% on 
a 10% significance level in the years surrounding the turnover. This confirms that 
our findings from step 1, displayed in table 3, are valid. 
 
Further, we find an increase in Cash, Dividends and Working Capital on a 10% 
significance level and a decline of Capital Expenditures on a 5% level. The 
increases in cash and working capital, along with the decline in capital 
expenditures, are measures that will strengthen the firm’s balance sheet, thus 
enhancing the robustness of the firm. It has been showed that if a company desires 
to take a greater risk for bigger profits and losses, it reduces the size of its working 
capital in relation to its sales. If it is interested in improving its liquidity, it increases 
the level of its working capital (Sushma & Shah, 2007). For a firm facing earnings 
cash flow constraints, it is natural that increases in cash and working capital is 
followed by a decrease in capital expenditure. As mentioned above, Jenter and 
Lewellen (2014) find that more than 40% of all turnovers are performance-induced, 
i.e. the change of CEO follows poor firm performance. We argue that a new CEO will 
aim to secure his position by improving the firm’s ability to withstand forthcoming 
financial distress by enhancing the robustness. However, the increase in dividend 
contradicts this explanation, but the difference is the smallest among the significant 
variables. We will show in section 5.3.2 that an increase of the dividends shortly 
after the turnover is penalized by the market.  
 
 
“In business, what’s dangerous is not to evolve.” 
Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon 
 
 
We do not find evidence for significant changes in the level of any of the other 
company fundamentals nor in any of the operational performance metrics. Hence, 
the change in CAR that is not explained by the changes of the significant company 
fundamentals discussed above, must origin in other factors. We aim to address 
these factors in section 5.3 and 5.4. 
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5.3 Drivers of CAR 
So far we have shown that the market reacts positively to a CEO turnover, and that 
the CEO turnover actually entails changes in certain company fundamentals and 
characteristics, mainly associated with increasing the fiscal robustness of the 
company. The next step will be to determine whether any of these fundamentals 
have a significant impact on CAR. We hypothesize that CEO initiated changes in 
company fundamentals will impact the abnormal stock return. Thus, we suggest that 
the right actions can positively impact how the market views the future value 
potential of the company. 
 
5.3.1 Methodology 
In this step, we are trying to use statistical inference to uncover if the isolated 
fundamental changes stated in step 5.2 have a direct effect on the CAR. In other 
words, we test if the market, on average, reacts to certain corporate re-structuring 
initiatives above others. To perform the analysis, we have utilized regression 
analysis, by ordinary least squares method. This method was found appropriate 
after testing the firm fixed- versus random effects, and generating the Lagrangian 
multiplier effect. In essence, the tests suggested insufficient evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that the between firm error term !! is correlated to the coefficients of the 
independent variables. Thus, a random effect model does not add explanatory 
power in excess of the ordinary least squares model17.   
 
Consistent with previous discussion, signal effects are the main contributors to 
announcement CAR, while implementing fundamental changes in subsequent years 
will be stronger contributors to CAR. Therefore, we construct the analysis separately 
for the turnover year, the first, and second full year the new CEO has been 
appointed. We isolate the effect of each independent variable on CAR for both 
years, capturing how the market reacts to the expectation of value in the turnover 
year, while the companies have to deliver tangible change for the market to re-price 
firm value after a period of time. 
 
 CAR calculations 
Transition year !"#!!!"#!!"#$ = !! + !∆!!!!! + !∆!!!!! +⋯+ ∆!!!!" + !! 
First full year !"#!"#!!""!!"#$ = !! + !∆!!!!! + !∆!!!!! +⋯+ ∆!!!!" + !! 
Second full year !"#!""!!"#!!"#$ = !! + !∆!!!!! + !∆!!!!! +⋯+ ∆!!!!" + !! 
  Table 5 - CAR model for transit ion year, year 1 and year 2 
 
                                                
17 For test output see appendix 8.2.1. For further explanation of the theory behind fixed and random 
effect models, see section 8.3.1.5. 
30"  
 
The change is recorded as year-over-year differences, using the year prior to the 
turnover year as basis. Balance sheet items can be recorded as 0% of total assets 
for any given year. Then, the year-over-year difference will reflect infinite change in 
the subsequent year. These observations are deemed extreme and removed from 
the dataset. This leaves ~60 out of 899 CEO observations for any given year. Even 
though this still leaves a representative sample, we experience that we are loosing 
essential predictive power.  
 
As opposed section 5.4, we are only concerned with identifying fundamentals where 
CEOs can affect change, and get rewarded/penalized in terms of stock returns. To 
guide the selection of significant independent variables, we have used the method 
of stepwise regressions. This function lets us automatically evaluate the F-statistic 
after adding/subtracting independent variables from the model18 (Kolesar, 2014). 
The methods continuously calculate an F-statistic dependent on the variables 
included in the model, and evaluate additional variables by its opportunity to 
enhance the goodness of fit. The forward F-statistic for Xi is given by  
 !!" = !"" !!,…!!!!,!!!!,… ,!! − !""(!!,,… ,!!)!"#(!!,… ,!!)  
 
and the backward F-statistic is given by, 
 !!"# = !"" !!,… ,!! − !""(!!,,… ,!!,!!!!)!"#(!!,… ,!!,!!!!)  
 
Where RSS is the residual sum of squares, MSE is the mean square error, and Xp is 
the variable to be added (FIN) or subtracted (FOUT) given its high or low partial 
correlation with the model as a whole. The final equation derives the regression 
function that most effectively reduces the residual sum of squares, and maximizes 
the F-statistic. 
 
                                                
18 The final models are formulated by using both FIN and FOUT. FIN begins with an empty model and adds 
and re-estimates the independent variables in sequence below threshold of significance. FOUT begins 
with fitting all independent variables to the model and removing insignificant variables in sequence, 
before re-estimating until each independent variable fulfills the set threshold. For these models, we 
have set the threshold to 20% significance.   
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5.3.2 Results 
In this section, we will explore whether changes in company fundamentals will act 
as drivers of CAR in the transition year and the first two full years the CEO has been 
in office. In table 6, column 1 shows the regression of firm fundamentals and 
characteristics on CAR in the transition year. Column 2 presents the same 
regression for the first full year the CEO held the office, and column 3 presents the 
regressions for year 2.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
    
∆ Dividends / Total Assets -0.388** -0.841***  
 (0.193) (0.209)  
Share structure -0.319**   
 (0.142)   
∆ Working Capital / Total Assets 0.0703  0.0891* 
 (0.0431)  (0.0485) 
E-Index 0.0533  0.0875** 
 (0.0398)  (0.0371) 
∆ CapEx / Total Assets  -0.167** 0.156 
  (0.0770) (0.108) 
∆ R&D  0.350*  
  (0.206)  
∆ Cash   -0.0656** 
   (0.0295) 
Forced turnover   0.346* 
   (0.193) 
Constant 0.0838 0.164*** -0.160 
 (0.121) (0.0479) (0.106) 
    
Observations 59 62 60 
R-squared 0.249 0.311 0.224 
Adjusted R-squared 0.193 0.275 0.152 
Type OLS OLS OLS 
VIF 1.10 1.08 1.25 
    Table 6: Sensit ivity of CAR to changes in corporate fundamentals from 0 to 750 days 
post-CEO turnover 
 
We have argued that the market’s view on the new CEO will partly materialize in 
abnormal return once the information is publicly available, as the efficient market 
theory suggests. We find that the only two variables returning significant results in 
the transition year are the ∆ Dividend / Total Assets and the Share Structure, both 
with a negative impact. This is consistent with table 4 from section 5.2.2. Thus, we 
find that if the dividend rate is increased during the transition year the market will 
respond negatively. It also shows that a company introducing or maintaining a dual 
share structure will have negative impact on the return.  
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A company with dual share structure will give increased voting power to a certain 
group of shareholders. The executive group will often be owners of “class A” 
shares, and if the CEO and his team control enough votes, they have substantial 
power in the company. This could cause investors to avoid involving themselves in 
companies where their shareholder power is diluted. If enough investors do not 
have sufficient confidence in the best judgment of the executive team to create 
value for shareholders, they may choose not to place their investments in 
companies that retains or introduces a dual share structure. Therefore, the return on 
the stock could diminish due to demand deficit. CAR would reflect this, and could 
explain why we see a negative relation between the dual share structure and CAR. 
Conversely, a single share structure would have a positive impact on CAR. This is 
supported by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2010) that find strong evidence that firm 
value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting 
rights.  
 
Increase in the dividend payments in the transition year also negatively impacts 
CAR. A company would normally increase their dividend payments when the 
expected return on new projects is less than the cost of capital (Miller & Modigliani, 
1961). Such an action would further signalize poor growth prospects. A CEO 
increasing the dividend already in the year he is entering office, could be signalizing 
that he have assessed the growth opportunities to be less attractive than previously 
believed. By increasing the dividend he is suggesting that the cash would be better 
deployed outside of the company, and we believe that the negative impact on CAR 
mirrors the market’s new outlook on the growth opportunities in the company. This is 
even more statistical significant in year 1 with higher impact on CAR. We suggest 
that this is due to the fact that after a year, the CEO has gained full information of the 
state of the company, and an increase in dividend will have stronger signaling 
power of weak growth prospects. 
 
An increase in capital expenditures has a significant negative impact on CAR in the 
first full year after the CEO turnover. Lowering ∆ Capital Expenditure / Total Assets 
increases the robustness of the company and we have previously discussed that 
the market seems to react positively on these measures. Allegedly, the market 
deems it in the best interest of shareholders to increase the robustness of the firm.  
 
In year 2, the CEO has entered office and is arguable in a position where he can 
make strategic choices. At this point the variables ∆ Working Capital / Total Asset, ∆ 
Cash / Total Assets E-index and Forced Turnover yield significant results. None of 
these variables proved significant in the transition year.  
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We show, in section 5.2.2, that firms tend to take measures to become more fiscally 
solid after a CEO turnover. We find that changes in working capital are positively 
correlated to increase in CAR in year 2. However, increases in the cash holdings 
have negative impacts on CAR, which shows us that the build-up of working capital 
must consist of non-cash items in order to be welcomed by the market. Noteworthy, 
the market seems to deprive stock value from companies that holds excessive cash 
balances, as these are funds that could have been used for internal projects or 
could have been deployed to the shareholders in increased dividends. This is the 
very argument the infamous activist investor Carl Icahn is posing to have Apple Inc. 
reduce its enormous cash holdings by conducting stock repurchases (Icahn, 2013). 
 
Further, we find positive relation between the entrenchment of the CEO and the 
CAR. The market seems to reward if the CEO is more protected from replacement. 
We argue that to turn around a company takes time and persistency. Keep in mind 
that more than 40% of the turnovers are performance-induced (Jenter & Lewellen, 
2014), and that the majority of companies are in need of large changes in their 
operations and strategy. A CEO with a higher degree of job security would be 
enabled to focus on the long-term improvements, rather than short-term gains to 
keep his job. The shareholders would arguably be better served with someone 
having the long-term performance in mind, and the entrenchment ensures him the 
necessary time to fully exercise his strategic plans. To support this, we find a 
positive relation between entrenchment and the CEO’s tenure19.  
 
Finally, the regression yields a positive impact on CAR if the former CEO left office 
involuntarily. Dezso argues that a CEO will only be fired if the potential gain from 
employing a new executive exceeds the cost of firing the current CEO (Dezso, 
2007). Thus, a board that has actually fired their CEO necessarily believes in a large 
potential gain from instating a new CEO. The market will, according to the EMH, 
react to this implied information and we argue that this could cause the CAR to soar. 
 
Summing up, certain CEO initiated changes of company fundamentals do have an 
impact on the abnormal return and enforces our belief that the market reacts to a 
CEO turnover because the new CEO reveals the true state of the company by 
performing certain strategic actions.  
 
                                                
19  The slope between the E-index and Tenure is 0.46% indicating higher tenure for higher 
entrenchment of the CEO 
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5.4 Drivers of fundamentals 
To this point we have shown that the market reacts positively to a CEO turnover and 
is followed by changes in certain company fundamentals that appears to strengthen 
the robustness of the balance sheet. Further, we have shown that the changes in 
some of these fundamentals have significant impact on the abnormal return. Hence, 
we have established that the CAR to some extent is influenced by the actions the 
new CEO induces.  
 
Now, we will explore whether the new CEO will be more inclined to perform certain 
strategic choices, in terms of changing the company fundamentals, depending on 
his background and other attributes. By testing for this, we are trying to establish a 
connection between the drivers of abnormal return and the new CEO’s attributes. 
We hypothesize that certain CEO attributes will shape the new CEO’s attempt to 
restructure the company through different value creating initiatives. 
 
5.4.1 Methodology 
The dependent variables in the models are selected based on the CEOs ability to 
affect the composition. As such, we evaluate the six corporate actions: changes in 
capital structure, rationalization of working capital, investments in research and 
development, ability to fund growth through capital expenditures or acquisitions, 
and, finally, dividend payout policy.  
 
As independent variables, the model uses the company fundamentals, E-index, 
share structure, former CEO retention, and forced turnover; and the CEO 
appointments’ attributes in internal versus external recruiting, board experience, 
age, educational background separated in engineering, MBA, and graduate school, 
and, finally, the percentage ownership in the company. To control for industry fixed 
effects, we have included industry factor variables by SIC category20.          
 
Since the dataset consists of panel data, it is best analyzed through controlling for 
unobservable effects. The models are formulated given evaluation on whether to 
transform the estimation through either random or firm fixed effects. In turn, we have 
selected the final models on the basis of Hausman tests and Lagrangian multiplier 
tests, which indicate whether it is appropriate to select fixed or random, and 
unobserved or ordinary least squares models, respectively. 
 
                                                
20 Nine industries are included in table 8. However, only eight appears as factor variables in the output 
as the industry ”Mining” is captured in the constant term. 
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To identify the panel entities in the dataset, each CEO turnover is given a unique 
number between 1 and 899 based on their ticker ID. This lets the model analyze 
each CEO appointment individually, even when multiple turnovers have occurred 
between 2003 and 2009 for the same firm. The panel entities are ordered by the 
time variable years since change for the turnover year 0, two years forward. In 
appendix 8.4.1 we formulate models with the appropriate unobserved effects. 
 
 Cross-sectional panel assumptions 
Panel variable CEO turnover (unbalanced)21 
Time variable Years since change, 0 to 2 
Delta 1 unit 
  Table 7 - STATA specif ications for panel entit ies across t ime variables 
 
After establishing that the inclusion of random effects will make more sensible 
predictions, the models were tested for the existence of variance across firms 
(panel entities). The Lagrangian multiplier test hypothesize that !"# !!" = 0. If a 
model fails to reject this condition, there is no evidence of significant differences 
between firms (panel entities), and an ordinary least squares model will yield the 
same results (Breusch & Pagan, 1980). In context of the test results, all of the six 
models benefit from the inclusion of random effects when predicting the dependent 
variable. However, in cases where the random effect models are suffering from 
heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation, we have utilized feasible least squares 
models (FGLS) to control for different variances in the standard errors between, and 
within, each panel entity. This is further described in appendix 8.3.2.2 and 8.3.2.4, 
and the statistical test output is displayed in appendix 8.2.7. The R2 displayed in 
table 8 is calculated on the basis of OLS (Baltagi B., 2008). 
 
We have chosen to run all six models on the same independent variables, 
regardless of the significance level, to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias. 
Further, the model is controlled for endogenous causality. For example, we find 
significance in the relation between the CEO possessing an MBA and the leverage 
of the firm. This could have two different implications; a CEO with an MBA could be 
more inclined to take on additional debt. It could also imply that firms with high 
leverage are more likely to hire CEOs with an MBA. In appendix 8.3.1.6 we will 
describe measures to reduce the uncertainty of which of the two approaches is 
more right.  
 
                                                
21 “Unbalanced” indicate that some CEO appointments are incomplete in terms of the time variable. 
This simply occurs when appointed CEOs only stay in office for less than 500 days. Recalling figure 3, 
64 CEOs had tenure less than 2 years  
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5.4.2 Results 
In this step, we have tested the company fundamentals against the CEO attributes 
and the firm characteristics after controlling for industry fixed effects. The regression 
is found in table 8 below. Controlling for industry fixed effects removes parts of 
discretionary effects from firm characteristics and CEO attributes on company 
fundamentals. However, we see different independent variables dictating the 
change for the various company fundamentals, beyond the industry 
categorization22.  
Leverage 
First, we have run a set of firm characteristics and CEO attributes against Leverage. 
Starting at the top of column 1, we find that entrenchment has positive, but small, 
impact on leverage. However, this finding is not consistent with the majority of 
previous literature on the topic that concludes that higher entrenchment should 
imply lower debt levels (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997). On the other side, John 
and Litov (2008) contradict this and suggest higher leverage for entrenched 
managers, arguing that they have better access to the debt market, perhaps as an 
outcome of conservative investment policy around CEO turnovers.  
 
Thereafter, externally recruited CEOs tend to have lower leverage than their 
internally recruited peers. Cao and Mauer (2010) find that CEO turnovers, in 
particular external CEO turnovers are a significant determinant of debt policy 
changes. The CEO has first-order influence on debt policy and we argue that a 
externally recruited CEO with less internal knowledge about the company’s debt 
capacity would prefer a lighter debt service during the restructuring period, in line 
with our argument that the new CEO tends to increase the robustness of the 
balance sheet.  
 
 
                                                
22  We attempted to create a consolidated model reflecting a ”robustness scale” combining the 
company fundamentals. However, the model did not yield any unambiguous or significant results. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage WC CapEx Acquisition Dividends R&D 
       
E-Index 0.00887*** -0.0240*** -4.46e-05 -0.000980 -0.00143 -0.00282 
 (0.00326) (0.00194) (0.000309) (0.00175) (0.00100) (0.00176) 
Share structure -0.0267 0.00729 -0.000187 0.0138* 0.00215 -0.0249*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0236) (0.00232) (0.00734) (0.00438) (0.00954) 
External recruiting -0.0489*** 0.00476 -0.00194** -0.00510 -0.00377 0.00462 
 (0.00884) (0.00914) (0.000892) (0.00454) (0.00274) (0.00600) 
Board experience 0.00511*** -0.00965*** -0.00102*** 0.000386 0.000333 -4.95e-05 
 (0.00109) (0.00140) (0.000140) (0.000582) (0.000353) (0.000772) 
Age 0.00391*** 0.000309 -7.25e-05 -0.000156 0.000101 -0.000602 
 (0.000690) (0.000594) (6.52e-05) (0.000341) (0.000199) (0.000379) 
CEO retention -0.0188** 0.0351*** 0.00131 0.00189 0.000851 0.0141** 
 (0.00814) (0.00890) (0.000912) (0.00450) (0.00272) (0.00594) 
Forced turnover 0.0546*** -0.0728*** -0.000397 -0.00891 -0.00408 0.00764 
 (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.00107) (0.00641) (0.00380) (0.00822) 
Engineering -0.0354*** 0.0435*** 0.00209 -0.00513 -0.00637** 0.0173*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0114) (0.00151) (0.00492) (0.00298) (0.00653) 
MBA 0.0497*** -0.0217** -0.00229*** 0.00875** 3.64e-05 -0.00547 
 (0.0101) (0.00875) (0.000705) (0.00444) (0.00268) (0.00584) 
Grad school -0.0323*** 0.0674*** -0.00737*** 0.0120** 0.00152 0.0117 
 (0.0104) (0.0179) (0.00152) (0.00539) (0.00330) (0.00726) 
Shares owned -0.548 0.116 -0.0619 -0.258 0.0826 0.299** 
 (0.346) (0.102) (0.0430) (0.212) (0.109) (0.150) 
Construction -0.123*** 0.248*** -0.0931*** -0.00285 0.000982 -0.00316 
 (0.0298) (0.0358) (0.0142) (0.0243) (0.0148) (0.0325) 
Manufacturing 0.0280* 0.126*** -0.0968*** -0.00561 0.0118* 0.0441*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0177) (0.00963) (0.0104) (0.00629) (0.0138) 
Utilities 0.111*** -0.0562*** -0.0500*** -0.0229* 0.0123* -0.000151 
 (0.0174) (0.0212) (0.0104) (0.0118) (0.00717) (0.0157) 
Wholesale trade -0.00316 0.176*** -0.113*** 0.00452 0.0137 0.00649 
 (0.0186) (0.0249) (0.0100) (0.0138) (0.00837) (0.0184) 
Retail trade 0.00343 0.0715*** -0.0697*** -0.0141 0.00304 -0.00166 
 (0.0155) (0.0219) (0.0102) (0.0116) (0.00697) (0.0152) 
Finance -0.0589*** -0.00267 -0.133*** -0.0116 0.00475 0.00361 
 (0.0216) (0.0199) (0.00962) (0.0125) (0.00755) (0.0166) 
Services -0.00904 0.111*** -0.107*** 0.00677 -0.00275 0.0362** 
 (0.0181) (0.0254) (0.00972) (0.0113) (0.00681) (0.0149) 
Constant -0.0906** 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.0328 0.00504 0.0314 
 (0.0411) (0.0332) (0.0106) (0.0216) (0.0127) (0.0251) 
       
Observations 764 764 764 772 769 769 
CEO entities 261 261 261 269 268 268 
R – squared 0.1494 0.3298 0.4138 0.0681 0.0949 0.2919 
Type FGLS FGLS FGLS Random Random Random 
VIF 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.08 2.08 
Panels Heterosc. Heterosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Homosc. Homosc. 
Correlation First order First order First order Indep.  Indep. Indep. 
       Table 8 - Regression matrix between (i i)  company fundamentals and certain ( i)  f irm 
characterist ics and CEO attr ibutes 
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CEOs with an MBA degree also tend to be employed by companies with higher 
leverage. We assess two reasons for that; (i) the business school background 
provides him with the necessary expertise regarding debt capacity and sources, 
which enables him to seek financing where non-MBAs wound not. More likely, (ii) 
the CEO has built a network through his studies and as alumni that facilitates for 
beneficial terms in the debt market. Further, both age and board experience 
correlates with higher leverage. Both variables are proxies for overall experience, 
and we argue, similarly to the argument regarding MBA, that with higher experience 
comes a wider network. Hu and Liu (2015) find in their study on Chinese 
corporations that CEOs with a larger network exploit more outside funds, such as 
bank loans and other parts of the debt market. This is in line with the second 
argument we offer. However, both Engineering and Grad School yield a negative 
relation to leverage. It seems that only relevant business experience will have the 
CEO to seek outside funds, also in line with the findings of Hu and Liu. 
 
Forced turnovers have a positive correlation with higher debt levels. We argue that 
the chance of being fired is higher in a company in financial distress where the 
equity value has seen subpar performance. As more than 40% of all turnovers are 
performance induced (Jenter & Lewellen, 2014), and highly leveraged firms lose 
substantial market share to their more conservatively financed competitors in 
industry downturns (Opler & Titman, 1994), a positive correlation between forced 
turnovers and leverage is plausible.  
Working Capital 
Second, we assess the drivers of working capital in column 2. Starting at the top, we 
see that the negative relation between entrenchment and working capital is 
significant at a 1% level. We have previously argued that the CEO seeks to make 
the companies more robust once he enters office. If the CEO is more entrenched, 
i.e. his position is more secure, the need for robustness is smaller and the CEO can 
run the company with lesser safety margins with regard to working capital. Further, 
there is a positive relation for external recruiting. Following the same line of 
arguments, a CEO coming from the outside will have less knowledge about the in-
house situation and what safety margins that might be required. We argue that he 
will seek to increase working capital in order to raise the robustness of the 
company. Higher experience, measured by the number of board memberships the 
CEO held, is negatively correlated with working capital. We argue that experience 
will improve the abilities to determine the minimum required level of working capital 
and thus achieve a more lean operation. Hence, a more experienced CEO will be 
more likely to have experience with the mechanics of different business models, 
which would increase the confidence in lowering the working capital. 
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Moreover, an engineering degree is positively related to a higher level of working 
capital. This could imply that engineers tend to hold higher inventory than their non-
engineer peers. As the majority of non-engineers fall within the business educated 
category, we propound that working capital management is a larger focus area 
within the business studies, something that is supported by the negative relation 
between working capital and an MBA degree.  
 
The last CEO attribute that returns significant results for working capital is the 
graduate degree variable. It shows a positive relation between having earned a 
graduate degree and the level of working capital. We allege that this is due to ~50% 
of the graduates majored in a non-business field. As MBAs are registered 
separately from other graduate degrees, the increase in working capital will follow 
the same line of arguments as for engineers earlier in this paragraph; the large 
degree of non-business graduates will drive the increase in working capital 
compared to their business educated peers.  
 
Lower working capital is associated with higher risk (Sushma & Shah, 2007). This 
explains the negative relation between forced turnovers and working capital where 
we argue that in companies where forced turnovers has occurred, the working 
capital management has been too lean and jeopardized the CEO’s position.   
 
Lastly, there is a positive relation between the retention of the former CEO as 
chairman and working capital. We use the same line of arguments as for forced 
turnovers. We find that companies that fired their CEO had significantly lower 
retention of the former CEOs than those who did not23. These two variables have the 
same underlying reason; low working capital implies higher risk and increased 
chances of firing of the CEO.  
Capital Expenditures 
Third, column 3 addresses the Capital Expenditure as dependent variable. Holding 
an MBA degree, being externally recruited, high board experience and holding a 
graduate degree will be negatively correlated to capital expenditure. Starting with 
external recruiting, we have previously argued that a CEO from outside of the 
company will seek higher robustness than an internally recruited CEO due to his 
inferior knowledge of the financial situation of the company. Hence, the externally 
recruited CEO will have lower capital expenditures to increase the robustness of the 
fiscal balance sheet.  
 
The next three independent variables all reflects the CEO’s experience, both 
educational and in business. An MBA would be more inclined to grow through 
acquisitions, as we show in column 4 in table 8. Following our argument regarding 
                                                
23 35% of the CEO’s who departed voluntarily was retained as chairman against only 6% of those who 
were fired. 
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network, an MBA candidate would arguably be more acquainted with people biased 
towards M&A transactions, as many MBAs come from investment banking, 
consulting and similar business areas. This argument is supported by the empirical 
results presented in table 8 below. Hu and Liu (2014) find similar results in their 
study on Chinese corporations and their CEOs’ backgrounds. To a certain extent, 
the same line of arguments are valid for Grad School and Board Experience, as 
these will also have gained a large network through their education and career, 
respectively.  
Acquisit ions 
Forth, we show in column 4 the drivers of Acquisitions. We have already discussed 
the variables MBA in the previous paragraph. In addition, Share Structure and Grad 
School also proves significant at a 5% level. We have argued that dual share 
structure gives the executive team increased control of the company, as they 
usually hold “Class A”- shares. This control would further enable them to pursue 
growth of the company through acquisitions. In the literature, this is often referred to 
as Empire Building, and will usually not be in the best interests of the other 
shareholders (Chevalier, 1998). This could explain the positive relation between 
Share Structure and Acquisitions, and could also elaborate why dual share structure 
tends have a negative effect on CAR, as discussed in section 5.3.2.  
 
Last, Grad School is positively correlated with Acquisition. Graham, Harvey and Puri 
(2009) imply an explanation for an inverse relation between overconfidence and a 
college degree, noting that it might indicate conservatism, as those impatient with 
their ambition might decide that higher education, especially a graduate degree, is 
not necessary. Extending to this idea, we argue that more conservative CEOs are 
less confident on the companies’ own projects, and rather rely on acquisitive growth 
where targets often have a proven track record. This is supported by a significant 
negative relation between Grad School and Capital Expenditure. 
Dividends 
Fifth, dividends are displayed in column 5. The regression does only yield 
significant results within a 5% level for one of the independent variables. Engineers 
tend to lower the dividend payout, but the evidence is weak and the effect is small. 
Even though section 5.3.2 argue that increases in the dividend policy is penalized 
by the market, we find little evidence that variations in firm characteristics and CEO 
attributes are causing changes in the dividend payouts. 
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Research & Development 
Finally, we show the results from the regression between R&D, and the firm 
characteristics and CEO attributes. The two variables showing the highest level of 
significance are Engineering and Share Structure, both significant at a 1% level. 
Starting with Engineering, we find a positive relation with R&D spending. Barker and 
Mueller (2002) also discover that significant R&D spending increases are found at 
firms where CEOs have advanced science-related degrees, engineering degrees 
among them (Barker & Mueller, 2002). We argue that their technical expertise will 
bias them into prioritizing research and development, as they can easily relate to the 
output.  
 
Further, Shares Owned yields a positive correlation with R&D spending. There is a 
U-shaped relationship between R&D spending and CEO ownership (Mezghanni, 
2010); R&D spending is negatively (positively) associated with CEO ownership at 
low (high) levels of CEO stockholding. Mezghanni argues that this result implies that 
at low levels of CEO ownership, an increase in CEO ownership exacerbates CEO 
myopia and the underinvestment problem with regard to R&D activities. However, at 
high levels of CEO ownership, CEO becomes more willing to invest in risky R&D 
projects, which may reflect a closer alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests. For our findings to be consistent with Mezghanni’s results, the CEOs in our 
sample must have relatively high ownership shares in the companies they manage. 
The average among the 899 CEOs in the sample is 0,45% of total shares. As we 
examine the 1500 largest companies in the US, we assert that 0,45% is a sufficiently 
large share of the total market capitalization, and that our findings are in line with 
those of Mezghanni.  
 
“The path to the CEO's office should not be through the CFO's office, and it should 
not be through the marketing dept. It needs to be through engineering and design” 
Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla Motors 
 
Thereafter, column 6 shows that Former CEO Retention is positively correlated to 
R&D spending. We offer two parallel suggestions for this; (i) when the former CEO is 
retained in the company as CEO, it is natural to believe that he maintains whole or 
parts of his ownership share in the company. When both the former and current 
CEO is involved in the decision-making regarding R&D, we argue that the effects 
discovered by Mezghanni will increase in strength, as incentives will magnify with 
the combined ownership share between the CEO and chairman. Another factor 
could be that (ii) certain sectors that tend to retain the former CEO as chairman are 
also R&D intensive sectors. We have run statistics implying correlation between 
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CEO retention and R&D spending24. We believe R&D intensive firms has more 
incentives to retain the former CEO, as he carries valuable knowledge in product 
development that he could potentially bring to a competitor. 
 
Finally, we find a negative relation between dual share structure and R&D 
investments. Gompers et al. (2008) argue that the separation between control and 
cash flow rights distorts corporate governance and may lead to a deprivation of 
value at the expense of minority shareholders. Majority shareholders have a 
tendency to support short-term compensation schemes over long-term gains from 
R&D investments. The short-term gain would most likely harm long-term prospects, 
due to underinvestment in R&D. Showing preferences for short-term gain over long-
term is consistent with the theory of hyperbolic discounting, suggesting that humans 
show a preference for a benefit that arrives sooner rather than later. Humans are 
said to discount the value of the later reward, by a factor that increases with the 
length of the delay (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). A dual share 
structure seems to strengthen this relationship in terms of R&D. 
 
Concluding remarks regarding drivers of fundamentals 
First, we find that MBAs and Engineers tend to have opposite preferences regarding 
financing, investment and growth strategies. An MBA will seek outside financing 
and will aim to grow through M&A rather than organically through capital 
expenditures and R&D. Second, entrenched executives make decisions focusing on 
short-term gains and self-serving outcomes, where less entrenched CEOs will make 
decisions more in line with the shareholders’ best interests. Third, more experienced 
CEOs tend to be less cash constrained and can utilize more financing options 
through external funding sources. They also tend to run a more lean operation. 
Finally, we find that more risk in the operations induces forced turnovers and that 
CEOs that are retained choose a more conservative and safe way in terms of 
leverage and working capital management.  
 
                                                
24 Especially two sectors remarks themselves in both R&D spending and CEO retention; Manufacturing 
and Services, which contains many of the tech companies known to invest heavily in R&D. 
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5.5 Predictive model for suited CEO attr ibutes 
At this stage we have shown positive market reactions to a CEO turnover, and that 
the turnover is followed by changes in company fundamentals aiming to increase 
robustness. Further, we have shown that some of these changes in fundamentals 
have significant impact on the abnormal return. In the previous subsection we 
showed that CEOs with certain attributes are more inclined to change these 
fundamentals than others. Here, we described corporate governance issues in 
relation to financing, investment and growth strategies in CEO turnovers.  
 
Now that we know how CEOs act differently based on their attributes, we are 
transitioning back to measuring market reactions to possessing these various 
attributes. We aim to separate the impact of certain CEO attributes to see whether 
they have different impact on CAR depending on what kind of company the CEO is 
employed in. This separation is important, as different companies will have different 
operational characteristics that demand certain CEO attributes. Thus, we 
hypothesize that large deviations between the expected and actual backgrounds 
and attributes of the appointed CEO’s will evoke stronger positive reactions in 
abnormal returns. This section aims to translate the findings from section 5.4, and 
examine how the market reacts when a firm hires an untypical CEO, who will make 
changes to the predecessor’s fiscal policies. 
 
5.5.1 Methodology 
This step utilizes a set of logistic models to determine probabilities that all the CEO 
hires in our dataset was completed with the purpose of finding the best possible fit 
in terms of industry and firm specific fundamentals. Throughout the thesis, we have 
assumed that a corporate board hires a CEO in the search for particular ability that 
can contribute to either maintain or increase firm performance. Further, we assume 
that S&P 1500 firms are accurate, on average, in finding individuals with the 
appropriate attributes and background to create shareholder value. In that way, we 
are able to evaluate the correctness of every CEO turnover based on educational 
background, quality of educational institutions and diversity from prior industry 
experience.  
 
To model across these qualities, the possession of MBA, engineering and 
undergraduate degrees are used as dependent variables for the academic field. 
Having attended a top-50 institution, regardless of education level, is a dependent 
variable for the quality of education, and the number of board memberships acts as 
a proxy variable for experience and diversity.  
 
As independent variables, the model uses different industries (determined by SIC 
codes), E-index, whether the firm is listed on New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq, 
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the capital structure of the firm given by Long-term debt/ Total Assets, and the 
innovation intensity represented by R&D / Total Assets25. Conceptually, we model 
the probability that any given firm tends to appoint a new CEO that matches certain 
criteria for educational field, alma mater and prior industry experience through a 
logistic equation: 
 ! !′! = !!(!! !≠ 0!|!!!) != !! exp !!!1 + exp !!! ! ,!ℎ!"!!!(!′!)!~![0,1]!
 
As opposed to a linear probability model (ordinary least squares) where the 
coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effect on Y per incremental shift in X, 
logistic regression estimates the natural logarithm for the odds26 and translates the 
categorical dependent variable to reflect the maximum likelihood in continuous 
convention. However, the functional form of the logistic model makes us unable to 
interpret the magnitude of each coefficient. Since we are interested in the how 
industries and firm fundamentals determines the qualities an aspiring CEO tend to 
possess, it is necessary to convert the logistic models to reflect marginal effects 
from each independent variable.  
 !" !!!! = !! !!! !! = ! !!!!(!!!!!!)! !!  
 
Since each dependent variable that we control for only includes categorical 
measures (0 and 1), we choose to not estimate the marginal effects at the mean, 
and rather calculate the average marginal effects. Reordering the equation yields  
 !" !!!! = !Σ!′ !!!! !! 
  
Essentially, the marginal effects are calculated as an average of the individual 
marginal effects, meaning that the actual value of each coefficient β is paired with 
each individual CEO’s categorical values xi averaged by the number of observations 
n in the sample.   
  
The main objective of estimating the probability that a CEO appointment included 
(or excluded) the appropriate profile is to investigate if the market reacts to CEO 
turnovers that deviate from the tendency, or rather, the expected hire for a specific 
firm. In order to estimate the degree of being an abnormal hire given the underlying 
firm characteristics, we utilize the residual value of the previously stated logistic 
models. 
                                                
25 Uses of cash earnings in acquisitions, capital expenditures and dividend payouts are excluded from 
this model, as they are variables resulting to a large extent from firm performance, rather than 
characterizing the operational challenges of the firm.   
26  The odds ratio is given by p/(1-p), and measures the degree of which a phenomenon has a 
probability of success (y = 1) relative the probability of failure (y = 0). Throughout this thesis, marginal 
effects are reported rather than odds ratios, as they give more meaningful econometric interpretations.  
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This approach is equivalent to flipping the notations in the average marginal effects 
model. As such, we derive the probability of how far a CEO was (dependent on the 
inherent categorical variable, 0 or 1) from matching the tendency of market hires, 
and therefore, the higher the residual probability, the more we expect the market to 
be surprised given our assumption that all firms, on average, tends to select CEO 
profiles matching their fundamentals. The last ingredient of this computation is to 
establish a model that evaluates the market shocks, in terms of CAR, to the surprise 
effect of CEO appointments. This is done through an ordinary least squares model 
with CAR as the dependent variable and the residual value e of the predicted fit P of 
CEO educational background and experience as the independent variables. 
 !"#! = !! ∙ !! ! !"# + !! ∙ !! ! !"#$"%%&$"# + !!! ∙ !! ! !"#$%&%'# + !!!∙ !! ! !"#!50 + !!! ∙ !! !(!"#$%!!"#!$%!&'!) + !!! 
 
With this model, we are able to identify the impact a CEO’s educational background 
and board experience has on CAR within the year of the turnover. 
 
5.5.2 Results 
In the following subsection we present the results from the predicative model where 
we measure the impact on CAR from hiring a CEO with specific attributes in a firm 
defined by certain firm characteristics and company fundamentals.  
 
“No one is born a CEO, but no one tells you that.” 
Drew Houston, CEO of Dropbox 
 
Table 9 shows the marginal effects, in probabilities, which the independent 
variables has on the dependent binary variables. The output is derived by 
translating probabilities from the underlying logistic models. Furthermore, the model 
predicts a generalized probability for which CEO profiles firms had a tendency to 
hire, given their industry and underlying fundamentals. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES MBA Engineering Undergrad school Top 50 
Board 
Experience 
      
Construction -0.325** -0.228 -0.267 -0.0731 -0.210 
 (0.130) (0.162) (0.170) (0.161) (0.142) 
Manufacturing -0.0375 -0.123 -0.131* 0.0603 -0.0500 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.0671) (0.101) (0.0982) 
Utilities -0.208* -0.110 -0.115 0.0415 0.154 
 (0.112) (0.117) (0.0777) (0.110) (0.109) 
Wholesale trade -0.170 -0.175 -0.238** -0.0821 0.0822 
 (0.134) (0.129) (0.108) (0.124) (0.138) 
Retail trade -0.176 -0.276** -0.218*** 0.0229 -0.0836 
 (0.116) (0.110) (0.0824) (0.112) (0.108) 
Finance -0.0558 -0.325*** -0.148** 0.0385 -0.0196 
 (0.112) (0.105) (0.0721) (0.105) (0.101) 
Services -0.0308 -0.255** -0.0357 0.309*** -0.00979 
 (0.117) (0.109) (0.0701) (0.110) (0.107) 
E-index 0.0448*** 0.0117 0.00148 0.00146 -0.0473*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0139) (0.0128) 
Exchange27 0.0201 -0.00887 0.0540 0.109** 0.112** 
 (0.0449) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0472) (0.0453) 
LT-debt / Total Assets 0.193* -0.0316 0.165 0.237** -0.0854 
 (0.114) (0.101) (0.111) (0.117) (0.113) 
Working Capital / Total Assets -0.0170 0.147 -0.189* 0.147 -0.460*** 
 (0.122) (0.0929) (0.109) (0.124) (0.123) 
R&D / Total Assets -0.107 0.756** 1.929*** 1.160** 1.157*** 
 (0.460) (0.302) (0.617) (0.478) (0.435) 
      
Observations 703 703 703 694 703 
VIF 2.72 2.72 2.72 2.72 2.72 
      Table 9 – Marginal effects on probabil i ty for hir ing a CEO possessing various attr ibutes 
 
Starting the interpretation from column 1, a firm in the construction industry 
decrease the probability of appointing a CEO with an MBA by ~32.5% relative to the 
mining industry, which is absorbed by the intercept. Likewise, utility firms are 
~20.8% less likely to appoint an MBA. Conversely, each incremental increase in the 
entrenchment index increases the probability of appointing an MBA by ~4.5%, and 
each percentage increase in Leverage (LT-debt / Total Assets) makes a firm ~0.2% 
more likely to hire an MBA28. This is consistent with the findings from section 5.4.2.  
 
                                                
27 TRUE indicates New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) while FALSE indicated NASDAQ. 
28 Even though we comment only on the variables significant at a 10% level, it’s important to note that 
the insignificant variables are important to each prediction. With the low multicorrelation, chances of 
introducing biases in the independent variables are considered low.  
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In column 2, the model shows the marginal effects on the probability of appointing a 
CEO with an engineering degree. Similarly to what can be generally expected, 
appointing a CEO with an engineering background have quite contradictory drivers 
than that for appointing MBAs. In context of the model, retail trade and finance 
remain as the industries that reduce the probability of hiring an engineer the most, 
decreasing by ~27.6% and ~32.5%, respectively. Moreover, each percentage 
increase in a firms research and development intensity (R&D / Total Assets) result in 
an ~0.76% increase in the probability of appointing an engineer.  
 
In column 3, the model evaluates the probability of appointing CEOs with higher 
educational experience. The criterion is the achievement of an undergraduate 
degree. When examining the findings, wholesale trade (~23.8%) and retail trade 
(~21.8%) appear as the industries that reduce the probability of appointing an 
educated CEO the most. In addition, financial (~14.8%) and manufacturing 
(~13.1%) firms are less probable to appoint non-educated CEOs.     
 
After evaluating the likelihood of appointing educated CEOs, column 4 in table 9 
shows the likelihood of appointing CEOs with an alma mater from one of the top 50 
universities. The only industry proven to be significant in increasing the probability 
of appointing CEOs from prestigious schools is Services; if a CEO is appointed in 
the services industry, he is 30.9% more likely to have graduated from one of the top 
50 institutions. Firms in this industry deliver (among other things) technology and 
consulting services, with firms like Adobe Systems, Ebay, Accenture and Yahoo!.  
 
“Certainly Yahoo! wouldn't exist without the sort of  
environment that Stanford gave us to allow us to create it.” 
Jerry Yang, former CEO of Yahoo! 
 
Secondly, a noteworthy finding is that NYSE listed firms are ~10.9% likelier to hire 
CEOs from top 50 institutions than Nasdaq listed firms. For the fundamentals, both 
capital structure (LT-debt / Total Assets) and research and development (R&D / 
Total Assets) have a positive effect on the probability of recruiting from top 50 
institutions, with ~0.2% and ~1.2% respectively.  
 
Finally, column 5 evaluates the probability of appointing CEOs on the basis of their 
experience, measured in board memberships. In summary, each increase in the 
entrenchment index reduces the probability of hiring an experienced CEO by 
~4.7%. Firms listed on NYSE are ~11.2% likelier to recruit experienced CEOs. For 
fundamentals, firms with high working capital needs are less probable to seek out 
experienced CEOs. Hiring an experienced individual decrease by ~0.5% in 
probability per percentage increase in working capital (Working Capital / Total 
Assets). Finally, each percentage increase in research and development (R&D / 
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Total Assets) increase the probability of recruiting an experienced CEO by ~1.2%. 
These findings are consistent with Hu and Liu (2014), where the results indicated 
that more diverse and experienced CEOs are less affected by asymmetric 
information and, thus, have an increased ability to raise external funds for cash 
constrained firms. 
 
In the subsequent analysis with output presented in table 10, CAR is evaluated 
against the probability that a CEO appointment was not following the tendency of 
the firm, given its industry and fundamentals as described in table 9 above. In other 
words, the model measures the reaction of the stock market based on how the 
profile of a recruited CEO deviates from the average fit as described by the logistic 
models.  
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Aggregated CEO fit 
  
|-|29 MBA 0.166 
 (0.117) 
|-| Engineering 0.0428 
 (0.0825) 
|-| Undergraduate -0.150* 
 (0.0900) 
|-| Top 50 0.0810 
 (0.124) 
|-| Board Experience -0.220** 
 (0.0979) 
Constant 0.0275 
 (0.0910) 
  
Observations 694 
R-squared 0.019 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0123 
VIF 1.13 
  Table 10 – Combined CEO attr ibutes’ impact on CAR  
 
From the output, deviations in degree and institution rankings seem to have little 
effect on market reactions. On the contrary, having at least an undergraduate 
education and fitting prior board experience is reflected in CAR. For each 
percentage point a CEO appointment is deviating from a typical hire, in terms of 
expected undergraduate education, the market, on average, reacts negatively at 
the magnitude of ~0.15%. Similarly, for each percentage point a CEO appointment 
is deviating in board experience from the probability of a typical hire, the market, on 
average, reacts negatively with a magnitude of ~0.22%. In table 8 in 5.4.2, board 
                                                
29 |-| = Indicates absolute difference 
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experience proved significant in making changes to company fundamentals. We 
argue that less cash flow constrains will provide more freedom in restructuring 
company balance sheets. Moreover, the fact that the market reacts to deviations in 
board experience, and not educational background, supports the argument that the 
market finds experience as a stronger determinant of ability to increase firm value30.  
 
Concluding the section, we find that the CAR is sensitive to the deviations from the 
typical CEO appointment, in terms of undergraduate education and board 
experience. An attribute that is valued in some firms might be penalized by the 
market in another type of firm31. We found in section 5.4.2 that MBAs and Engineers 
differ in fiscal strategies. However, when the CEO holds any of these two degrees, 
and this deviates from what is expected, the market does not react even though it 
may expect a re-structuring of company fundamentals due to the CEO’s untypical 
education. To add clarity to how the model works in practice, we have included the 
example of Jerry Yang from Yahoo! in appendix 8.5.1. 
 
5.6 CAR as predictor for operational performance metrics 
So far, we have seen that the market reacts positively to CEO turnovers and that the 
turnover is followed by changes in company fundamentals. Thereafter, we show that 
the abnormal return is significantly impacted by the changes of the fundamentals. 
Further, we find that CEOs with certain attributes are more inclined to change these 
fundamentals than others. However, the different CEO attributes have different 
impacts depending on which type of company the CEO is employed by. The major 
trend is that any deviations from the peer norm are penalized by the market. Hence, 
we disprove an unambiguous relation between CEO attributes and abnormal return 
through the CEOs’ actions regarding company fundamentals.  
 
To conclude this thesis, we will see whether the market in the transition year is 
efficient in identifying CEO turnovers that yield positive and negative changes in 
operational performance in the long-term. We hypothesize that abnormal return will 
materialize in subsequent changes in operational performance metrics. 
 
                                                
30 Elaborating on board experience, appointing a CEO with above average board experience to a firm 
that requires a focused experience profile will impact CAR differently than appointing a CEO with low 
experience to a firm that require an experienced profile. In appendix 8.1.3, the causality of each 
independent variable is separated. 
31 We have attempted to include the deviation of fit for MBAs and Engineers in the regressions in table 
8 in section 5.4.2. However, these did not yield any significant results, suggesting that the deviation of 
fit does not dictate any changes in the company fundamentals and that the market reaction comes 
solely from expectations of the new CEO’s ability to improve the business strategy. 
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5.6.1 Methodology 
In the final step of the thesis, we construct ordinary least squares models to predict 
if the stock market as a whole is correct in their reactions to CEO turnovers. To 
assess this question, we have picked return on assets (ROA) and EBITDA margin as 
measurements for performance and profitability, respectively. Subsequently, we 
have calculated the differences in ROA and EBITDA margin for each individual firm 
from the year prior to the CEO turnover, three years into the future. To test the 
performance metric against the time of the CEO turnover, we lag the transition year 
CAR to match the performance and profitability in the two years following each 
turnover. 
 
 Lagging Period 
 ROA EBITDA margin 
Transition year ∆!"#!!!!"# = !!"#!!!!"#  ∆!"#$%&! "#$%&!!!!"# = !!"#!!!!"#  
First full year ∆!"#!!"#!!"" = !!"#!!!!"#  ∆!"#$%&! "#$%&!!"#!!"" = !!"#!!!!"#  
Second full year ∆!"#!!""!!"# = !!"#!!!!"#  ∆!"#$%&! "#$%&!!""!!"# = !!"#!!!!"#  
   Table 11 - Measuring the CAR in transit ion year against ROA and EBITDA margin 
 
5.6.2 Results 
We argue that if the market correctly anticipates improved performance in the 
future, the effect of improvement would materialize in positive CAR immediately after 
the information is available to the market32. Hence, we should be able to use the 
CAR as a predictor for the operational performance metrics. Column 1 in table 13 
and 14 below presents the regression between CAR and the operational 
performance metrics, for the transition year. Column 2 and 3 displays the regression 
for the first and second full year of the CEO, respectively. We find statistical 
significance for using the CAR in the transition year as a predictor for both ROA and 
EBITDA margin in subsequent years33. 
 
                                                
32  We have made a point out of drawing a clear line between what we refer to as operational 
performance metrics, such as ROE, ROA and EBITDA margin, and the market-based performance 
metrics, such as CAR. The latter metric is based on the stock performance, and hence the markets 
underlying view on how the company is performing, whereas the operational metrics are measured by 
items from the financial statement. 
33 However, we find no evidence of the same effect for ROE. As ROE only reflects the results of a 
company's equity investments, a company could be highly leveraged with a risky amount of debt and it 
will show an improving ROE if that debt is generating income. There are large variations of leverage 
between the firms in the sample, and this will impact the consistency of ROE. Therefore, we are not 
baffled by the lack of significance and persistency for this particular performance metric. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
    
CAR 0.000156 0.0166*** 0.00986** 
 (0.00288) (0.00390) (0.00478) 
Constant -0.00233 -0.000474 0.00301 
 (0.00162) (0.00219) (0.00266) 
    
Observations 899 899 835 
R-squared 0.000 0.020 0.005 
Adjusted R-squared -0.00111 0.0188 0.00388 
    Table 12 - CAR as predictor for ROA 
 
We find a positive relation between an increase in CAR in the transition year, and 
ROA in year 1 and 2. We argue that the market to a certain extent has been able to 
interpret legitimacy behind the strategy and visions communicated by the new CEO 
at the time he entered office. We further argue that the CEO actually has been able 
to deliver the results implicitly expected from him and his company by the market.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
    
CAR 0.0972** 0.0796*** 0.0591* 
 (0.0437) (0.0229) (0.0333) 
Constant -0.0311 0.00915 0.0109 
 (0.0246) (0.0129) (0.0185) 
    
Observations 899 899 835 
R-squared 0.005 0.013 0.004 
Adjusted R-squared 0.00438 0.0122 0.00257 
    Table 13 - CAR as predictor for EBITDA margin 
 
We find the same positive relation between the CAR and EBITDA margin. Here, we 
also find significance in the transition year. A positive CAR in the transition year 
correlates with increase in the EBITDA margin. We argue that the market has 
interpreted the skills and strategy of the new CEO correctly, and find the prospects 
of operational improvements plausible with the new CEO entering office.  
 
Our analyses indicate that the market is rational and manages to predict whether 
the CEOs can make prosperous changes in the firms’ operations that will materialize 
in improved operational performance metrics.  
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6. Conclusion and interpretation 
In this thesis, we have studied the impact on market performance from a CEO 
turnover. We have explored different aspects of the new CEO’s attributes, firm 
characteristics and certain company fundamentals that we believe to be subject to 
considerable managerial discretion, and how they impact the cumulative abnormal 
return in the time after the turnover date.  
 
“An organization, no matter how well designed, is only as 
 good as the people who live and work in it.” 
Dee Hock, Former CEO of VISA 
 
We have aimed to shed light on the overall research question “What impacts the 
market reaction to a CEO turnover?” using a sample of 899 CEO turnovers in S&P 
1500 firms from 2003 through 2009. Through a six-step experiment, we have tested 
various aspects of the turnover, and tested the different aspects against each other. 
First, we find that the market in general welcomes a CEO turnover, as the CAR is 
negative in the year leading up to the turnover, and turns positive over the next 2 
years.  
 
Second, we find that, in addition to a market reaction, there are actually significant 
changes in certain firm fundamentals before and after the turnover. There is 
tendency that the new CEO aims to make the company more robust once he enters 
office. Increases in Working Capital, along with decreases in Capital Expenditure 
contribute to a more solid balance sheet.  
 
Third, we find that these measures to increase the robustness of the firm’s balance 
sheet tend to be welcomed by the market. Changes in the company fundamentals 
that are changing after the CEO turnover show significant impact on CAR in the first 
year the new CEO holds his position.  
 
Fourth, we move on to exploring which firm characteristics and CEO attributes that 
correlates with the company fundamentals that are subject to considerable 
managerial discretion. We find that CEOs that hold an MBA degree tend to be more 
biased towards acquisitions over capital expenditures, taking on higher leverage 
and operate with leaner working capital management. Conversely, the CEOs with an 
engineering degree act the complete opposite when it comes to financing, 
investment and growth strategies. They focus on capital expenditure and R&D, in 
contrast to the MBAs who focus on acquisitions and leverage. Further, we find that 
entrenched executives make decisions focusing on short-term gains and are self-
serving biased, where less entrenched CEOs will make decisions more in line with 
the shareholders’ best interests. We also find that more experienced CEOs tend to 
be less cash constrained and can utilize more financing options through external 
 53"
 
funding sources. They also tend to run a more lean operation in terms of maintaining 
a low working capital level. Thereafter, we find that more risk in the operations, given 
by low working capital levels and high leverage, induces forced turnovers. CEOs 
that are retained choose a more conservative and safe way in terms of leverage and 
working capital management.  
 
Fifth, we model that various CEO attributes are more common for certain companies 
than others. To add to the results in step four, the model yields higher probability for 
hiring MBAs and engineers in companies with high leverage and high R&D, 
respectively. By aggregating the results, we find that hiring a CEO deviating from 
the norm will only significantly impact CAR for the variables Undergraduate School 
and Board Experience. Undereducated CEOs yields reductions in CAR, while both 
CEOs with higher and lower board experience than the average will reduce CAR. 
However, other circumstances will play the majority role of driving CAR, as the 
explanation power is less than 2%. 
 
Finally, we show that the improvements anticipated by the market, measured by 
CAR, actually will materialize by improvements in operational performance metrics. 
Both ROA and the EBITDA margin, describing operational profitability and efficiency 
respectively, show positive development in the two years following the transition 
year where CAR has been positive.  
 
To summarize, the market seems to welcome a change of CEO. After the turnover, 
the new CEO tends to increase the robustness of the company; a strategy that also 
appears to be rewarded by the market. MBAs and Engineers show opposite 
behavior on several fundamentals subject to managerial discretion, and MBAs tend 
to run the operations with lesser margins, in terms of balance sheet robustness. 
Nonetheless, the different behavior between MBAs and engineers does not explain 
the market reaction. However, we show that only deviation in (i) experience and (ii) 
holding at least an undergraduate degree compared to the average hire for the firm 
is decisive for the market reaction, where only experience also show ability to affect 
company fundamentals. Lastly, abnormal market returns have been showed to 
materialize in operational performance in the succeeding years of the turnover, and 
confirm that the market is able to identify successful CEO turnovers.  
 
In whole, the CEO’s background and attributes does not appear to have a large 
impact on company performance, thus confirming numerous other studies on CEO 
turnover. There are also several soft factors that are hard to control for, such as the 
network popularity effect and takeover rumors. To incorporate such effects into the 
model would be a natural next step of analysis. Then, the model would be able to 
control for differences due to other items than CEO attributes and changes in 
company fundamentals. Another interesting factor to incorporate would be to 
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account for the former CEO’s attributes, and measure its compatibility to the new 
CEOs background and experience. 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1 Data tables  
 
8.1.1 Variable Descript ions 
Variable name Descriptions Data source 
(i) CEO attributes   
Age Age in year he became CEO CompuStat 
Gender Male or female CompuStat 
Corporate afterlife Retained in the company as chairman CompuStat 
External Recruiting Joined company within before he became CEO  CompuStat 
Former CEO retention The former CEO stayed as chairman after he left office CompuStat 
Forced turnover Exits that was involuntary – assumed firings The executive turnover risk premium 
Number of board 
memberships Total number of boards the CEO is sitting in Capital IQ 
Salary Fixed portion of compensation ExecuComp 
Bonus Performance-related portion of compensation ExecuComp 
CEO ownership The CEO’s ownership share in the company including stock options ExecuComp 
Field of study Business, law, engineering, social studies, service & administrative, science, other Capital IQ 
Top school ranking Ranking of the best university attended by the CEO Times Higher Education 
Dual Degree Completing more than one degree at the same education level Capital IQ 
Number of different 
fields of study 
Number of fields the CEO has completed a degree 
in throughout his complete education Capital IQ 
Qualification 
dummies 
Dummy variables indicating CEO’s qualifications, 
i.e. completed degrees within misc. fields Capital IQ 
(ii) Company 
fundamentals   
S&P index S&P Largecap, Midcap and Smallcap CompuStat 
SIC division 10 divisions based on first digit in SIC number CompuStat 
Exchange Stock traded on NYSE or Nasdaq CompuStat 
Share Structure Dual or single share structure What matters in corporate governance? 
Credit rating S&P credit rating for each year CompuStat 
E-index Entrenchment index based on IRRC’s provisions What matters in corporate governance?  
CapEx Capital Expenditures CompuStat 
ACQ Acquisitions CompuStat 
SG&A Sales, general and administrative costs CompuStat 
R&D Research and development cost CompuStat 
Dividend Cash dividends CompuStat 
LT debt Long-term debt CompuStat 
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Variable name Descriptions Data source 
   
(iii) Company 
Performance   
Tobin’s Q Market value / book value of debt and equity CompuStat 
ROE Return on Equity: EBITDA / Market Capitalization CompuStat 
ROA Return on Equity: EBITDA / Total Assets CompuStat 
EBITDA margin EBITDA / Revenues CompuStat 
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return for 1 year intervals over Fama-French four-factor model Eventus 
   Table 14 – Definit ion and sources of input variables 
 
8.1.2 Sector classif ication 
Sector SIC number Description Number of companies 
A 0000 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1 
B 1000 Mining 30 
C 1000 Construction 14 
D 2000, 3000 Manufacturing 352 
E 4000 Transp., com., electric, gas, and sanitary service 97 
F 5000 Wholesale trade 34 
G 5000 Retail trade 80 
H 6000 Finance, insurance and real estate 169 
I 7000, 8000 Services 122 
J 9000 Public administration - 
    Table 15 – SIC codes included in each overal l  sector 
 
8.1.3 Separated coeff icients for CAR impact from CEO fi t  model 
 
Figure 11 - The impact on CAR in transit ion year by possessing non-typical attr ibutes 
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8.1.4 Modif ied university ranking 
#   University Country Attrib.  Attend.  Overall Score 
1 Harvard University US 99 % 100 % 100,0 % 
2 Stanford University US 99 % 59 % 79,1 % 
3 Massachusetts Institute of Technology US 98 % 25 % 61,6 % 
4 University of Pennsylvania US 86 % 34 % 60,2 % 
5 University of Chicago US 92 % 25 % 59,0 % 
6 University of Michigan US 86 % 31 % 58,6 % 
7 University of California, Berkeley US 95 % 19 % 57,3 % 
8 Columbia University US 88 % 25 % 56,6 % 
9 Cornell University US 84 % 25 % 54,9 % 
10 Princeton University US 96 % 10 % 53,7 % 
11 Northwestern University US 84 % 22 % 53,4 % 
12 Yale University US 93 % 12 % 52,6 % 
13 California Institute of Technology US 100 % 1 % 51,0 % 
14 City University of New York US 74 % 26 % 50,6 % 
15 University of California, Los Angeles US 89 % 10 % 50,0 % 
16 University of Oxford UK 99 % 0 % 49,7 % 
17 University of Cambridge UK 98 % 0 % 49,1 % 
18 Johns Hopkins University US 88 % 6 % 47,2 % 
19 Imperial College London UK 93 % 0 % 46,6 % 
20 University of Wisconsin - Madison US 76 % 16 % 46,5 % 
21 University of Washington US 78 % 15 % 46,5 % 
22 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign US 76 % 15 % 45,8 % 
23 Duke University US 85 % 6 % 45,6 % 
24 ETH Zürich-Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich CH 90 % 0 % 45,1 % 
25 Carnegie Mellon University US 79 % 10 % 44,8 % 
26 Georgia Institute of Technology US 77 % 10 % 44,0 % 
27 Pennsylvania State University US 67 % 18 % 42,5 % 
28 University of Toronto CA 84 % 0 % 42,3 % 
29 University College London UK 84 % 0 % 42,0 % 
30 Indiana University US 52 % 31 % 41,8 % 
31 University of Southern California US 62 % 19 % 40,8 % 
32 University of Tokyo JP 81 % 0 % 40,6 % 
33 Boston University US 68 % 12 % 39,8 % 
34 University of Texas at Austin US 77 % 1 % 39,3 % 
35 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München DE 76 % 1 % 39,1 % 
36 National University of Singapore SG 78 % 0 % 39,1 % 
37 University of British Columbia CA 76 % 1 % 39,0 % 
38 University of Virginia US 55 % 22 % 38,9 % 
39 University of California, Santa Barbara US 74 % 1 % 38,1 % 
40 University of Melbourne AU 76 % 0 % 38,0 % 
41 École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne CH 75 % 0 % 37,9 % 
42 London School of Economics and Political Science UK 75 % 0 % 37,8 % 
43 University of Edinburgh UK 75 % 0 % 37,5 % 
44 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill US 70 % 4 % 37,4 % 
45 Brown University US 68 % 6 % 37,2 % 
46 McGill University CA 74 % 0 % 37,1 % 
47 Purdue University US 56 % 18 % 37,1 % 
48 King’s College London UK 74 % 0 % 37,0 % 
49 University of California, San Diego US 73 % 0 % 36,7 % 
50 University of Pittsburgh US 60 % 13 % 36,6 % 
      Table 16 – Top 50 universit ies by the modif ied ranking 
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8.1.5 Change in fundamentals surrounding CEO turnover 
  N Mean Mean Diff.  Mean Diff.  
Panel A  Days -250 to 0 Days 0 to 250 Days 0 to 500 
CAR 899 0,003 0,027 0,0237* 0,028 0,025 
Tobin's Q 899 1,422 1,358 -0,0642* 1,383 -0,039 
ROE 899 0,335 0,266 -0,0687 0,090 -0,2445** 
ROA 899 0,125 0,125 0,0000 0,122 -0,002 
EBITDA margin 899 0,158 0,156 -0,0020 0,130 -0,028 
EV / Sales 899 2,339 2,342 0,0037 2,570 0,232 
Revenues / TA 899 0,951 0,939 -0,0119 0,947 -0,003 
Acquisitions / TA 899 0,018 0,020 0,0017 0,018 -0,001 
Capital Expenditures / TA 899 0,046 0,042 -0,0034** 0,043 -0,003 
Cash / TA 898 0,041 0,047 0,0053* 0,049 0,0076** 
LT debt / TA 899 0,182 0,178 -0,0040 0,181 -0,002 
Working Capital / TA 899 0,156 0,166 0,0101* 0,166 0,010 
Dividends / TA 896 0,013 0,015 0,0018* 0,015 0,002 
R&D / TA 896 0,022 0,022 0,0004 0,022 0,000 
SG&A / TA 896 0,182 0,181 -0,0019 0,183 0,000 
Sale of Property / TA 896 0,002 0,002 0,0003 0,002 0,000 
Sale of Investments / TA 896 0,070 0,082 0,0115 0,065 -0,005 
E-index 706 2,530 2,551 0,0213 2,537 0,007 
CEO ownership 553 0,002 0,004 0,002*** 0,003 0,0014** 
Share Structure 706 0,101 0,097 -0,0033 0,101 0,000 
        N Mean Mean Diff. Mean Diff 
Panel B  Days -250 to 0 Days 250 to 500 Days 500 to 750 
CAR 899 0,003 0,032 0,0284* 0,021 0,017 
Tobin's Q 899 1,422 1,353 -0,069 1,336 -0,0862* 
ROE 899 0,335 0,282 -0,053 0,438 0,104 
ROA 899 0,125 0,125 0,000 0,127 0,003 
EBITDA margin 899 0,158 0,169 0,011 0,170 0,012 
EV / Sales 899 2,339 2,234 -0,104 2,213 -0,125 
Revenues / TA 899 0,951 0,940 -0,011 0,928 -0,023 
Acquisitions / TA 899 0,018 0,021 0,002 0,022 0,0034* 
Capital Expenditures / TA 899 0,046 0,042 -0,0038** 0,042 -0,0037* 
Cash / TA 898 0,041 0,046 0,005 0,045 0,004 
LT debt / TA 899 0,182 0,176 -0,006 0,179 -0,004 
Working Capital / TA 899 0,156 0,168 0,0123* 0,164 0,008 
Dividends / TA 896 0,013 0,014 0,001 0,015 0,0023** 
R&D / TA 896 0,022 0,022 0,000 0,022 0,001 
SG&A / TA 896 0,182 0,181 -0,002 0,178 -0,004 
Sale of Property / TA 896 0,002 0,002 0,000 0,002 0,000 
Sale of Investments / TA 896 0,070 0,090 0,020 0,090 0,020 
E-index 706 2,530 2,558 0,028 2,559 0,029 
CEO ownership 553 0,002 0,004 0,0022*** 0,006 0,0039*** 
Share Structure 706 0,101 0,099 -0,001 0,092 -0,009 
       Table 17 – Change in company fundamentals surrounding CEO turnover in an extended 
period 
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8.1.6 Cumulative Abnormal Return calculat ion sett ings 
 Search settings for Eventus calculations 
Basic event study Daily – with Fama-French 
Search by PERMNO and CUSIP 
Grouping No 
Weighting CRSP Value Weighting 
Method Fama-French Four-Step 
Estimation period End Before Event Date (EST): -46 
 Minimum Estimation Length (MINESTN): 15 
 
 Maximum Estimation Length (ESTLEN): 250 
 
Autodate Back 
Estimate method OLS 
Event Period Pre: -500 Post: +750 
Alternative window -500 to +750 in 250 days intervals 
Statistical tests Patell and DCA 
Output parameters P-value and Detail 
  Table 18 - Sett ings that have been used in the Eventus software for our sample 
 
To further elaborate on the theoretical steps, the following paragraphs describe how 
the four-factor Fama-French model is used to calculate CAR in our sample of CEO 
turnovers.  
 
The event’s impact is measured by the “Abnormal return” 
 !"!" = !!" − ! !!" !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!!"#$!!, !"!#$!!"#$!! 
 
The market model for expected return – assumes a stable linear relation between 
the market return and the firm’s return 
 ! !!" !! = !! + !!!"! + !!" 
 
Define the estimation window to estimate the parameters: !! ,!! , !"# !!  
 
Then compute the abnormal return  
 !"!" = !!" − !! − !!!"! 
 
Test Null hypothesis: The event has no impact on the behavior of returns (mean or 
variance). !"!"~! 0, !"# !"!"  
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For further inference, abnormal returns must be aggregated over time and across 
securities. 
 
i) Over time: Cumulative abnormal return from t1 to t2: 
 !"#! !1, !2 = !"!"!!!! !!!"#! !1, !2 = !2 − !1 + 1 !"# !" !!!"#! !1, !2 ~! 0, !"#! !1, !2 !!!
 
ii) Across securities: Average Abnormal return: 
 !!"! = !"!"!!!! !!!"# !!"! = 1!! var !"!!!! !
 
iii) Then all securities across time: 
 !""#! !1, !2 !"!!!!!! !!!"# !""#! !1, !2 var !!"!!!!! !!!""#! !1, !2 ~N 0, !"# !""# !1, !2 !
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8.2 Statist ical robustness tests  
8.2.1 Hausman test for f ixed or random effect 
 Coefficients   
Variable Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
∆ LT-Debt ~t 0.0022258 0.0006564 0.0015694 0.0012228 
∆ CapEx -0.1248847 -0.1319374 0.0070527 0.0404415 
∆ Cash -0.0346438 -0.0241026 -0.0105412 0.0155622 
∆ WC 0.0238834 0.0480894 -0.024206 0.0165983 
∆ R&D 0.031404 0.0016595 0.0297445 0.1447869 
∆Dividends ~l -0.0080135 -0.0117212 0.0037078 0.0405342 
Percentage ~d 19.17123 8.640385 10.53084 7.031375 
E-Index ~d 0.0350883 0.0567807 -0.0216924 0.1272451 
     
H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 8.87 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3534 
    Table 19 - Hausman test to determine f ixed or random effects. u i correlated with 
regressors, random effect model appropriate. 
  
 
8.2.2 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian mult ipl ier test 
 Variance St.dev = √Variance 
CAR 0.1462703 0.382453 
e 0.1135495 0.3369711 
u 0.0239365 0.1547143 
   
H0: Var(u) = 0 across panel entities 
Chibar2(01) = 1.57 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.1052 
 Table 20 - Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian mult ipl ier test for random effects test to 
determine the use of random effect model versus ordinary least squares. No variance 
across f irms detected. OLS is the appropriate model.  
 
 
8.2.3 Breuch / Pagan Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity  
Variables: fitted values of CAR Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
Chi2(1) = 0.29 1.08 0.81 
Prob > chi2 = 0.59 0.30 0.36 
    
H0: Constant variance    
    Table 21 - Breuch / Pagan Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity to ensure models 
with constant variance. Model has homoscedastic distr ibution of errors.  
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8.2.4 Hausman test for f ixed or random effects 
 Leverage Working Capital Capex Acquisitions Dividends R&D 
Chi2(3) =  4.31 4.21 6.85 2.86 2.17 6.42 
Prob>chi2  0.2303 0.2392 0.0769 0.4141 0.5375 0.0928 
Appropriate effects Random Random Random Random Random Random 
       
H0: difference in coefficients not systematic     
       Table 22 - Hausman test for f ixed or random effects shows that al l  models predicting 
CEO attr ibutes’ effect on corporate fundamentals are appropriate with random effects, 
since the difference in static coeff icient cannot be deemed statist ical ly signif icant   
 
 
8.2.5 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian mult ipl ier test 
 Leverage Working capital Capex Acquisitions Dividends R&D 
Chibar2(01) =  395.14 591.19 497.21 2.72 299.85 632.23 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0496 0.00 0.00 
Appropriate model Random Random Random Random Random Random 
       
H0: Var(u) = 0 across panel entities     
       Table 23 - Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian mult ipl ier test to determine that a random 
effect models wil l  provide increased predictive power since the variance across f irms 
(panel entit ies) is statist ical ly different from zero 
 
 
8.2.6 Likel ihood rat io test 
 Leverage 
Working 
capital Capex Acquisition Dividends R&D 
Iterations 878 >10000 >10000 34 76 27 
LR chi2(268) = 866.14 828.80 706.84 -9809.31 -9100.92 -13368.23 
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Preferred model Un-restricted 
Un-
restricted 
Un-
restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
Panels error 
distributions 
Hetero-
scedastic 
Hetero-
scedastic 
Hetero-
scedastic 
Homo-
scedastic 
Homo-
scedastic 
Homo-
scedastic 
       
H0: model more robust with homoscedastic errors     
       Table 24 - Likel ihood ratio test to assess whether f irm fundamentals are best modeled 
after hetero or homoscedastic error distr ibutions 
 
 67"
 
8.2.7 Wooldridge test for autocorrelat ion in panel data 
 Leverage 
Working 
capital Capex Acquisition Dividends R&D 
F(1, 241)  59.55 30.757 7.653 0.868 1.174 1.011 
Prob > F  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.35 0.28 0.32 
Correlation 
distributed errors 
First order 
AR(1) 
First order 
AR(1) 
First order 
AR(1) Indep. Indep. Indep. 
       
H0: no first-order autocorrelation     
       Table 25 - Autocorrelat ion tests to determine whether to model f irm fundamentals with 
independent or f irst order serial correlation in standard errors 
 
 
8.2.8 Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for goodness of f i t  in logist ic models 
Criteria: MBA       
Group Prob Obs_1 Exp_1 Obs_0 Exp_0 Total 
1 0.1963 11 11.8 60 59.2 71 
2 0.2349 18 15.3 52 54.7 70 
3 0.272 17 17.7 53 52.3 70 
4 0.299 19 20.3 52 50.7 71 
5 0.3292 18 22 52 48 70 
6 0.3588 27 24.1 43 45.9 70 
7 0.3856 26 26.3 45 44.7 71 
8 0.4089 29 27.8 41 42.2 70 
9 0.4475 29 30.1 41 39.9 70 
10 0.6319 35 33.6 35 36.4 70 
Observations      703 
Groups      10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)      2.67 
Prob > chi2      0.9531 
       
H0: probability model is well fitted       
       Table 26 - Hosmer-Lemeshow tests to describe goodness of f i t  in logist ic models, 
measuring the typicali ty of CEO appointments with the criteria MBA 
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Criteria: Engineering       
Group Prob Obs_1 Exp_1 Obs_0 Exp_0 Total 
1 0.0312 2 1.9 69 69.1 71 
2 0.067 3 2.9 67 67.1 70 
3 0.0947 7 5.7 63 64.3 70 
4 0.1605 6 8.6 65 62.4 71 
5 0.1903 11 12.5 59 57.5 70 
6 0.2108 15 14.1 55 55.9 70 
7 0.2395 20 15.9 51 55.1 71 
8 0.2779 18 18.1 52 51.9 70 
9 0.329 16 21.3 54 48.7 70 
10 0.6652 33 30.2 37 39.8 70 
Observations      703 
Groups      10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)      5.22 
Prob > chi2      0.7338 
       
H0: probability model is well fitted       
       Table 27 - Hosmer-Lemeshow tests to describe goodness of f i t  in logist ic models, 
measuring the typicali ty of CEO appointments with the criteria Engineering 
 
 
Criteria: Undergraduate degree       
Group Prob Obs_1 Exp_1 Obs_0 Exp_0 Total 
1 0.6426 43 40.7 28 30.3 71 
2 0.7124 44 47.7 26 22.3 70 
3 0.7478 54 51.7 16 18.3 70 
4 0.7647 47 53.7 24 17.3 71 
5 0.7905 55 54.5 15 15.5 70 
6 0.8126 55 56.1 15 13.9 70 
7 0.8277 67 58.3 4 12.7 71 
8 0.8507 61 59.4 10 11.6 71 
9 0.8903 58 60.2 11 8.8 69 
10 0.9962 63 64.8 7 5.2 70 
Observations      703 
Groups      10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)      13.99 
Prob > chi2      0.082 
       
H0: probability model is well fitted       
       Table 28 - Hosmer-Lemeshow tests to describe goodness of f i t  in logist ic models, 
measuring the typicali ty of CEO appointments with the criteria Undergraduate degree 
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Criteria: Top 50 university       
Group Prob Obs_1 Exp_1 Obs_0 Exp_0 Total 
1 0.2156 16 12.8 54 57.2 70 
2 0.2669 14 17.4 55 51.6 69 
3 0.2917 15 19.5 55 50.5 70 
4 0.3199 15 21.1 54 47.9 69 
5 0.3406 29 22.8 40 46.2 69 
6 0.3615 24 24.6 46 45.4 70 
7 0.3806 29 25.6 40 43.4 69 
8 0.4137 29 27.7 41 42.3 70 
9 0.5271 36 31.5 33 37.5 69 
10 0.8567 38 41.9 31 27.1 69 
Observations      694 
Groups      10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)      11.22 
Prob > chi2      0.1897 
       
H0: probability model is well fitted       
       Table 29 - Hosmer-Lemeshow tests to describe goodness of f i t  in logist ic models, 
measuring the typicali ty of CEO appointments with the criteria Top 50 University 
 
 
Criteria: Board Experience       
Group Prob Obs_1 Exp_1 Obs_0 Exp_0 Total 
1 0.1526 13 8.4 58 62.6 71 
2 0.1934 12 12.3 58 57.7 70 
3 0.2212 12 14.5 58 55.5 70 
4 0.2537 15 17.1 57 54.9 72 
5 0.297 17 18.9 52 50.1 69 
6 0.324 18 21.8 52 48.2 70 
7 0.3715 27 24.7 44 46.3 71 
8 0.4315 26 27.8 44 42.2 70 
9 0.5067 39 32.8 31 37.2 70 
10 0.6982 40 40.6 30 29.4 70 
Observations      703 
Groups      10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)      7.64 
Prob > chi2      0.4695 
       
H0: probability model is well fitted       
       Table 30 - Hosmer-Lemeshow tests to describe goodness of f i t  in logist ic models, 
measuring the typicali ty of CEO appointments with the criteria Board Experience 
70"  
 
 
8.2.9 Breuch / Pagan Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 
Variables Fitted values of CAR given absolute deviation from typical CEO fit 
chi2(1) = 0.61 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4365 
  
H0: Constant variance  
  Table 31 - Breuch / Pagan Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity when modeling 
the effect on CEO background on cumulative abnormal returns in CEO turnovers 
 
 
8.2.10 Breuch / Pagan Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 
Variables Fitted values of ∆ in ROA from year -1 (-250 to 0 days) 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
Chi2(1) 0.06 1.25 1.53 
Prob > chi2 0.8079 0.263 0.2156 
    
Variables Fitted values of ∆ in EBITDA margin from year -1 (-250 to 0 days) 
  Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
Chi2(1) 0.91 1.34 0.29 
Prob > chi2 0.3408 0.2466 0.5908 
    
H0: constant variance    
    Table 32 - Breuch / Pagan Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity assessing if  the 
market reaction at the t ime of CEO appointments identif ies CEOs with potential to make 
fundamental changes in companies, across three years post CEO turnover 
 71"
 
8.3 Econometric tests 
 
8.3.1 Stat ist ical robustness 
To further analyze the reliability of our findings, we have tested each individual 
model for the inclusion of econometric issues. In this section, we will explain the 
assumptions behind each test and why it is important for the robustness of our 
results. Each test metric is reported in its respective model, and visual post 
regression diagnostics are included in appendix 8.2.  
 
8.3.1.1 Level of signif icance 
Throughout the thesis, we have exclusively evaluated independent variables given a 
95% confidence interval. However, since our dataset is capturing all the CEO 
turnovers for S&P 1500 corporations between 2003 and 2009, we interpret 
independent variables of up to 10% in p-value, because data collection has 
reduced the risk of sample selection bias.   
 
8.3.1.2 Heteroscedasticity 
An important assumption for the use of the functional forms of ordinary least 
squares, is a constant linear relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables. Heteroscedasticity refers to the circumstance in which the 
variability of a variable is unequal across the range of values of a second variable 
that predicts it. To evaluate if a model is appropriate in making statistical inference 
on the dependent variables’ CAR and corporate re-structuring initiatives, we utilize 
post regression diagnostics to investigate if the residuals are evenly distributed 
around the mean, which essentially indicate whether a model is suffering from 
heteroscedasticity34.  
 
Essentially, we utilize the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test to assess if constant 
variance across independent variables, !"# ! !! = !! , exist. In addition, White’s 
criterion is added to test the presence of skewness and kurtosis to quantify to what 
extent a model may be in breach of normality. As the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test alone assumes linear forms of heteroscedasticity, the White 
component assumes a non-linear relationship between the fitted values ! and the 
variance !! . When in doubt, the thesis has utilized visual assessments of the 
residual patterns to select the appropriate test. Thereafter, the functional form of 
ordinary least squares as the tool for analysis is evaluated for each statistical model. 
If heteroscedasticity cannot be disproven, other functional forms have been derived. 
 
                                                
34 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity is included for each model in appendix 8.2. 
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For random effect models, we test for heteroscedasticity by comparing two versions 
of the model: an unrestricted version with heteroscedastic error structure, and a 
restricted version with homoscedastic error structure (Hoechle, 2007). By fitting both 
models using generalized least squares method, we utilize the likelihood test 
statistic to determine if a heteroscedastic error structure (unrestricted model) offers 
a better fit than homoscedastic (restricted). The steps and test output are presented 
in appendix 8.2.6.   
 
8.3.1.3 Mult icol l inearity 
Multicollinearity arises when two or more independent variables show linear 
correlations. In cases where the correlation between sets of independent variables 
is high, the statistical inference becomes biased as the standard errors become 
inflated 35 . Throughout the thesis we have tested for multicollinearity through 
monitoring the variance inflation factor (VIF), and formulated the statistical models to 
reflect acceptable VIFs. VIF shows how much an ordinary least squares models’ 
variance !! increases because of correlation between the independent variables. 
VIF is derived by 
 !! = !!!! + !!!!,… ,!!!!" + !!! 
 
Subsequently, the VIF for variable ! is defined as, 
  VIF! = ! 1(1 − R!!) 
 
Where Xi is regressed against all the other independent variables in the model. The 
VIF is subsequently determined by the magnitude of the goodness of fit !!!. When !!! = 0 the model is perfectly orthogonal with an ideal !"# = 1. A !"# > 5 Indicate 
strong multicollinearity, and, thus, the statistical models throughout the thesis are 
constructed to generate mean VIF below this threshold36. 
 
8.3.1.4 Autocorrelat ion 
To formulate unbiased statistical models, the residuals need to be independent, 
normally distributed random variables, not only across fitted values !, but also 
across time. As such, we test for the presence of constant variance 
(heteroscedasticity), but in time series models it’s particularly important that the 
variance is uncorrelated between time variables, which in this thesis is years since 
                                                
35 In this scenario, the likelihood of committing a type 1 error increases. This is rejecting a true null 
hypothesis due to inflated confidence intervals that inaccurately reduces p-value(s) of independent 
variables in the model. 
36 Mean VIF is reported in every regression model where applicable. 
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CEO turnover. In consistency with the efficient market hypothesis that abnormal 
return reacts to different events at different times, we have derived models focusing 
on particular years since CEO turnover, except in step 4, where we utilized a 
random effect model across 3 years (0 to 750 days) to assess the relationship 
between 70 groups of CEO attributes and their potential to change corporate 
fundamentals. The rationale for constructing this model over several years is the 
assumption that it takes years until corporate restructurings are reflected on the 
financial statement. 
 
When present in a model, autocorrelation reflects the similarity between 
observations as a function of time lag between them (Kolesar, 2014) following the 
equation: !! = (!! − !)(!!!! − !)!!!! (!! − !!!!! )  
 
Where ! is represents autocorrelation given the time lag !, and ! represents the 
observations at a given point in time. In adherence with Drukker and Wooldridge, 
we reformulate the random effect functions to test time variant panel data 
 !!" − !!"!! = !!" − !!"!! !!,… , !!" − !!"!! !! + (!!" − !!"!!) 
or, ∆!!" = ∆!!"!!,… ,∆!!"!! + ∆!!" 
 
This equation derives the effect of the first differences in the CEO attributes in 
predicting the first differences in corporate initiatives. Now, the autocorrelation test 
hypothesize that there is insignificant correlation between residuals !!" across time 
lags for the firms (panel entities) in our sample (Baltagi & Wu, 1999). The random 
effect models presented in section 5 are all derived to not include autocorrelation37.    
 
8.3.1.5 Fixed and random effects 
Based on variable inflation factor test for multicollinearity, likelihood ratio tests for 
heteroscedasticity, and Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in cross-sectional data, 
the random effect models presented in section 5 includes generalized least squares 
transformation in the error structures to control for presence of econometric 
problems where appropriate. The different assumptions are reported in each model, 
with the tests listed in appendix 8.2.1 to 8.2.6. 
 
                                                
37 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation included in appendix 8.2.7 
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8.3.1.6 Endogeneity 
When a model is affected by endogeneity, it becomes difficult to conclude on the 
direction of causality. In every instance where the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
is used as the dependent variable, there is low risk of endogeneity. The reason 
being that most of the independent variables are either recorded or accumulated at 
a time prior to deriving CAR, making CAR a complete response to variations in 
variables surrounding a CEO appointment. Conversely in step 4, level values of 
corporate re-structuring initiatives can introduce endogeneity. For example, we 
model under the assumption that education, E-index and share structure all affect 
the capital structure of a firm, scaled by its total assets. But, in reality, the causality 
can also run the other way. For instance, an MBA might have a positive effect on 
leverage, while an engineer has a negative. Here, we cannot rule out that the effect 
stem from the fact that a highly debt dependent firm needs, and also seeks to hire, 
CEO candidates with business backgrounds, while the opposite is true for 
engineers. At the same time, CEOs with more insider equity ownership might be 
reluctant to issue debt, because it imposes a risk on the value of their stock based 
compensation. By using a random effect model, we are able to control for the 
causality between firms (panel entities), which mitigates the issue of endogeneity.       
 
8.3.1.7 Goodness of f i t  in logist ic regressions  
Under the assumptions of ordinary least squares, there will be inefficiencies in the 
model if heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation are present. Since the logistic 
models formulated in this thesis are strictly focused on the turnover year (0 to 250 
days), there is no time variable and autocorrelation will not become an issue. 
Conversely, the concept of heteroscedasticity changes in logistic models. Recalling 
section 5.6.1, the dependent variable is a probability rather than a numeric value. 
Fluctuations around the fitted value may, therefore, be due to uncertainty relating 
from all the variables not included in the prediction (Williams, 2009). As such, this 
thesis defines that the probability of a firm’s tendency to hire CEOs with specific 
backgrounds and experiences is based exclusively on the independent variables 
that we were able to include. Even though the models are presented with some 
degree of uncertainty in the residuals, they are tested for joint significance and 
goodness of fit.  
 
As defined in section 8.3.1.3, the logistic models are tested for multicollinearity 
through assessing the mean variance inflation factor. To estimate the goodness of fit 
of the logistic models, we order the predicted probabilities in ten equal sized 
groups, deciles, and evaluate the fitted versus actual values within each group. The 
reason for this breakdown is that in its non-limited form, the covariate patterns falls 
close to the number of observations, which makes Pearson !!  inappropriate 
(Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). The Hosmer-Lemeshow coefficient 
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hypothesize that the logistic model is well fitted. All the logistic models ensured 
fulfilling the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit, and the test output is reported in 
appendix 8.2.8. 
 
8.3.2 Variable robustness 
In section 4, we give a thoroughly description of all the variables we have collected 
in the dataset. In the methodology and result sections not all of these variables are 
accounted for. The reason is that when we conducted the statistical analyses the 
omitted variables proved not to be significant in any of the tests, or returned N-
values too small for the tests to be valid when these variables were included in the 
models. We find the same trends and results when including these variables, but 
chose to omit them as the findings presented in section 5 proved more solid without 
them.  
 
In the same manner, we have also conducted the tests for several different time 
ranges, concluding that the ranges presented in the section above were the most 
appropriate. Using the period from -250 to 0 days as the pre-turnover period, and 
limit the focus on the post-turnover period to 0 to 750 days, we found the models 
yielding the highest explanation power and significance. The six tests described in 
section 3 were also tested for the period -500 to 0 days against a variety of ranges 
between 0 to 250 and 0 to 1000 days after the turnover. Again, we found the time 
ranges presented in section 5 to be the most appropriate. In appendix 8.1.5 we 
have included the findings from step 2 for a selection of additional time ranges. 
 
8.4 Elaborations on statist ical methods 
 
8.4.1 Formulation of random versus f ixed models 
Through the definitions of time variables, we are able to fit a fixed effect model that 
controls for time in-variant predictors within each firm or CEO characteristic that can 
bias the estimation of corporate actions (Stock & Watson, 2007). For example, 
dummy variables related to the appointed CEO’s background, such as whether an 
individual have an MBA or engineering degree, or if the former CEO left the firm 
under forced or voluntary terms, will remain constant for the entire estimation period. 
These characteristics may bias the predictor variables. To elaborate on the previous 
examples, an MBA might have belonged to a network that gives him a better 
precondition to affect leverage post-appointment, while an engineer may have 
perspectives on product development that directly affect the capital allocation to 
research and development. In addition, if the former CEO was forced out due to 
lacking performance, the newly appointed CEO may be given a more liberal 
mandate to restructure the firm. The fixed effect equation is given by 
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 !!" = !!! + !!!!" ,… ,!!!!" + !!!" 
 
In statistical terms, the fixed effect model controls for correlation between the error 
term (!!") and the unobserved effects (!!). Furthermore, time static variables are 
considered unique to each individual CEO appointment, and should not have 
statistical inference with time-variant (such as share ownership, age and board 
experience) characteristics surrounding the turnover. Following this method, the 
fixed effect model strips the unobserved intercept (!!) for effects that are constant 
over time, and allows for correlation with the independent variables. Then, the 
omission of static variables in tandem with minimizing the variance in the 
unobserved effects across the time variable, will ensure a model that predicts the 
dependent variable solely based on factors that a newly appointed CEO is able to 
change over time.   
 
Even though a fixed effect transformation is sensible to isolate CEO specific 
changes, the difference in static independent variables across firms (panel entities) 
is important for the ability to affect corporate actions. For instance, if a given firm 
has a high entrenchment index that remains static over the two-year period, a CEO 
appointment may have more headroom to make controversial changes to the 
balance sheet than a CEO appointment that has a low static entrenchment index 
over the same period. If this assumption holds over the set of static variables that 
were omitted in the fixed effect model, differences across firms (panel entities) will 
affect CEOs’ abilities to influence dependent variables.  
 
To control for the significance of the time static variables, a random effect model is 
constructed 
 !!" = !!! + !!!!" ,… ,!!!!" + !!!" + !!!" 
 
Where the error term !!" is added to control for the unobserved effects across firms 
(panel entities). This relies on the assumption that !!" is not correlated with !! given 
the independent variables. A premise for choosing random over fixed effect models 
is that the error term !!" between panel entities is uncorrelated with the independent 
variables (Hausman, 1978). To test for this, we have utilized the Hausman 
specification test, which hypothesize that !"# !!" ,!!" = !0. The test results suggest 
that all of the six models have systematic differences in the coefficients, that !!" is 
not correlated with the !! given the independent variables specified by the fixed 
effect models, and indicate that time static variables has an effect on the dependent 
variables when evaluated across entities.  
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8.5 Clarifying examples 
8.5.1 Predict ive model for market reactions to deviat ing CEO attr ibutes 
To add further clarity to section 5.5.2, the results are interpreted through the 
practical example of Jerry Yang, who was appointed as the new CEO of Yahoo! the 
18th of June 2007. He holds a masters of science in electrical engineering from 
Stanford University, and served in 15 boards at the time. Given Yahoo’s 
characteristics and fundamentals, the model in table 9 calculated a ~24.6% 
probability that the new appointment should have an MBA, a ~13.0% probability of 
recruiting an engineer, a ~92.1% tendency to hire an individual with at least an 
undergraduate degree, a ~52.3% likelihood that this individual should be from a top 
50 institution, and a ~45.0% probability that a typical candidate should have above 
average industry experience. To predict the effect on CAR, the model takes the 
absolute probability of reciprocal CEO fit. Larger deviations mean increasingly 
untypical CEO appointment. By aggregating the magnitude the actual values has on 
each coefficient from table 9, table 10 calculates the predicted CAR. 
 
VARIABLES 
Degree of 
typicality for 
Yahoo! 
Jerry Yang’s 
attributes 
Absolute deviation 
from typical CEO Effect on CAR 
     
MBA38 24.6% 0 24.6% 4.1% 
     
Engineering26 13.0% 1 87.0% 3.7% 
     
Undergraduate 92.1% 1 7.9% -1.2% 
     
Top 5026 52.3% 1 47.7% 3.9% 
     
Board Experience 45.0% 15 55.0% -12.1% 
     
Constant 2.8% - - 2.8% 
     
Predicted CAR - - - 1.2%  
Actual CAR - - - 24.1% 
     
Table 33 – Practical example: the typical f i t  of Jerry Yang and the market’s reaction to 
the CEO turnover at Yahoo in 2007 
 
If the market were only responding to a CEO’s background and board experience 
and his average fit to the fundamentals of the company, the Yahoo! stock would 
generate an abnormal return of 1.2% during the first 250 days Jerry Yang was in 
office. However, the Yahoo! stock actually generated an abnormal return of 24.1%. 
As such, our model only explains 1.9% of the variations in one-year announcement 
CAR at CEO turnovers. In the context of stock returns, this is not necessarily a low 
number. Under the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices follow the predictability 
                                                
38 Not statistically different from zero, but used in the model for illustrative purposes 
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of a random walk. This means that if all past data on CEO education, experience 
and firm fundamentals could predict the price; the abnormal return would be priced 
in at announcement. But in reality, there are immeasurable factors at play in almost 
every CEO turnover in our dataset that affect CAR. 
 
Consider Bob Iger, who became CEO of Disney in 2005, implemented the 
acquisition of Pixar Animation Studios in 2006, resulting (at least partly) in a CAR of 
~13.2% during the first 250 days. The market simply believed that Disney would be 
able to create more valuable animation films, and that Bob Iger had the skills 
needed to continue to find additions to Disney’s intellectual property portfolio. The 
market was right; in 2008 Disney purchased Marvel Studios, which led to the 
production of high grossing blockbusters like Spiderman, Ironman, and The 
Avengers (Forbes, 2009).         
 
After understanding how the market reacted to the CEO change in Disney, consider 
the unexplained effect on the CAR of Yahoo! (Shown in table 11) after the 
appointment of Jerry Yang. Having founded Yahoo! in the late 1990’s, Yang was 
seen as a returning visionary at a time Yahoo! was struggling to find value. The 
contributions to CAR was neither his visionary nor strategic plans – it was rather that 
the market anticipated he would entertain a hostile takeover bid from Microsoft that 
valued Yahoo! at a 62% premium. Surprisingly, Yang declined the offer on the 
grounds that his strategies for Yahoo! would make the future free cash flows more 
valuable (Forbes, 2008). Thus, Yahoo!’s CAR in 2007 was driven by perceived value 
from hostile takeover rumors made by Microsoft rather than Jerry Yang’s 
background and his ability to create strategies to enhance the value of the firm. This 
is one of several examples in our dataset where it’s hard to quantify factors that 
affect CAR in CEO turnovers. 
  
 
